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Abstract 
This paper examines developments in government procurement arrangements across the Tasman to 
assess the extent to which recent trade, especially preferential agreements, of Australia and New 
Zealand containing government procurement commitments have contributed to any reform in these 
policies. It argues that (preferential) trade agreements have had little or no impact on any such 
reforms, and that in the case of Australia, such commitments have not prevented procurement 
arrangements from going backwards. Transparent price preferences favouring local content have been 
largely replaced by hidden and more costly discretionary discriminatory measures. In sharp contrast to 
Australia, New Zealand seems to have maintained a relatively open and non-discriminatory 
government procurement regime based not on commitments in trade agreements but rather on 
unconditional MFN unilateral reforms. The central policy message is trade agreements cannot 
substitute for unilateral reforms. 
Keywords 
Government procurement, Australia, New Zealand, trade agreements, governance 
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1. Introduction 
The Government procurement market in both Australia and New Zealand (ANZ) is significant, 
especially if procurement by sub-central government agencies is included. Procurement covers both 
goods and increasingly services, including construction. Australian Commonwealth procurement alone 
amounted to $48.9 billion in 2013-14, up from $39.3 billion in 2012-13, and total State Government 
procurement is about the same. Total State and Commonwealth procurement in 2013-14 amounted to 
about 6.5% of GDP. Such procurement is overwhelmingly sourced from Australia, including within 
own States. New Zealand (NZ) government procurement (excluding by local governments) amounts to 
some NZ$38-40 billion annually, equivalent to currently around 15% of GDP.  
ANZ have evolved decentralized systems of government procurement both at the national and sub-
central governments. Purchasing is done by the procuring agency following rules and procedures set 
by centralized agencies and with their guidance and monitoring.  
Due to its importance, the efficiency of government procurement can significantly impact on a 
country’s overall resource-use efficiency, and on government budgets. Thus, reforming government 
procurement to open the market to overseas competition is likely to help address budgetary concerns 
and more importantly significantly improve economic efficiency. Mindful of this, greater attention is 
now being devoted globally to negotiating government procurement provisions in trade agreements, 
whether multilateral, bilateral or plurilateral/regional. A critical issue is therefore whether these trade 
agreements have been effective in promoting significant domestic reforms in parties’ government 
procurement systems. Or put another way, have they helped domestic liberalization, had no impact or 
even possibly hindered such domestic reforms? These questions have become even more pertinent 
given the proliferation of discriminatory preferential trade agreements (PTAs), with many more being 
negotiated or in the pipeline. This PTA explosion stems largely from governments heralding them as 
big improvements on earlier versions as modern 21
st
 century agreements by including provisions in 
new areas, such as government procurement. Thus, government procurement also provides an 
excellent case study of PTAs generally of their capacities to reform such policies, to see whether PTA 
provisions deliver nothing more in practice than merely expanding negotiations of commitments on 
‘paper’?  
Consistent with this approach the paper examines the impact of trade agreements on ANZ domestic 
government procurement policies, and not on the extent to which they may have raised export 
opportunities by opening overseas procurement markets. While the later commercial opportunities are 
often seen by governments and trade ministries as the main benefits of trade agreements this is a 
misnomer. The main gains from trade openness accrue from self-liberalization, not from others 
opening their markets to increase export opportunities. This is because replacing domestic production 
with more efficient imports improves the economy’s allocative efficiency by releasing resources to be 
used more productively, whether in import-competing, exporting or non-tradable activities. Increasing 
exports per se, especially of particular goods or services to certain markets, does not necessarily raise 
GDP or national welfare, while trade creation from imports displacing inefficient activities does so 
unambiguously. Thus good economic sense is to focus on the impact of trade agreements in increasing 
the economy’s imports, not their exports. This is the primary economic test that all trade agreements, 
including PTAs, should be assessed. 
It is common for the economic benefits of trade agreements through increased export potential to 
be exaggerated and oversold by trade ministries and governments (APC, 2009). Market opportunities 
are only a minor contributor to export success. Opportunities must be realized. This depends on supply 
responses and the exporters’ competitiveness, which is affected by many factors, mainly their 
efficiency which is affected by home economic, including trade-related, policies (e.g. their economy’s 
openness) and exchange rates.  
Thus, for trade agreements to be worthwhile economically they must help promote domestic 
unilateral reforms, the best and ultimately the only sustainable method of achieving meaningful 
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economic openness and gains. This is where trade agreements, especially PTAs, are failing. PTAs in 
particular are potentially harmful economically because they promote discriminatory liberalization, 
usually in tariffs.
1
 PTAs rarely change actual non-tariff measures but where they do also open up 
possibilities of trade diversion. Trade Agreements, including PTAs, typically involve negotiating ‘on 
paper commitments’ that either match existing actual measures or more likely that contain substantial 
binding overhang by being less open than actual measures, and hence have no impact on actual trade 
barriers.  
Thus, PTAs embrace discriminatory or preferential approaches (conditional MFN) to liberalization 
in contrast to normal WTO ‘unconditional’ MFN agreements. More importantly, PTAs contradict 
unilateral reforms, the most efficient approach since by nature they would be non-discriminatory based 
on ‘unconditional’ MFN. PTAs undermine unilateralism as governments focus on keeping 
‘negotiation coin’ for future PTAs and base their trade policy thinking on flawed mercantilism that 
national welfare is enhanced mainly by getting other countries to liberalize and not from self-
liberalization. PTAs also erode the WTO multilateral system by weakening its fundamental principle 
of ‘unconditional’ MFN. In this regard, the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (WTOGPA) is 
even an exception to the WTO, being an unattractive plurilateral ‘conditional’ MFN or 
preferential/discriminatory agreement.  
Given the mercantilist dynamics of negotiating trade agreements, especially PTAs, overselling their 
perceived benefits from overseas market access is virtually inevitable. Each party negotiates from the 
position that ‘exports are good and imports are bad’, and accordingly adopt defensive strategies to get 
other parties to liberalize while conceding as little reciprocal opening as possible. Governments are not 
using trade agreements to promote self-liberalization, where most of the economic gains derive, but 
more often to entrench current protective arrangements or even to extend them. Thus it is no shock 
that trade agreements end up being ‘more gloss than substance’ snowed in window dressing being 
negotiated for foreign policy and other reasons but sold on dodgy economic gains. 
This paper attempts to shed some light on the domestic policy implications by examining the role 
played by ANZ PTAs in setting their government procurement policies. Evaluating the effectiveness 
of trade agreements against each country’s actual procurement policies is the only meaningful 
benchmark to use since it is actual policy changes that matter, not simply negotiating commitments 
‘on paper’. ANZ are negotiating a network of bilateral and interlocking plurilateral PTAs, often 
containing government procurement provisions. NZ has also just acceded to the WTOGPA and 
Australia has announced it is likely to follow. Both countries previously rejected joining the 
WTOGPA as it was seen to be a bad agreement.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 examines the development of Australian government 
procurement policies at the Commonwealth and most importantly State levels. Section 3 briefly looks 
at the NZ central government procurement policies. Section 4 examines the approach and 
commitments made by ANZ in their trade agreements, especially in PTAs (or their equivalent). 
Section 5 examines Australia’s continued use of government procurement as industry policy. Section 6 
concludes the paper.  
2. Australia’s Government Procurement Policies 
An important milestone in Australian government procurement policies was the National Preference 
Agreement (NPA) signed in 1986 by the Commonwealth and State governments to phase out 
respective price preferences that favoured own-state suppliers. Price margins were calculated using the 
                                                     
1
 Unlike in the WTO where tariff bindings (caps) are negotiated, such that actual tariffs may not be changed, actual tariffs 
are negotiated in PTAs. However, changing actual tariffs preferentially bring with them the prospects of generating trade 
diversion in goods, which if on balance exceeding trade creation, can reduce the national welfare of PTA parties.  
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amount of own-state content. They were also applied against imported content. During the 1980’s the 
push to remove inter-state price preferences developed as they became increasingly seen as major 
impediments to Australian growth.  
NZ joined the NPA in June 1989. This followed a review of the Australian and New Zealand 
Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA), which entered into force in 1983. 
ANZCERTA agreed to a single Tasman government procurement market by calling for ANZ to work 
towards eliminating price preferences favouring domestic procurement (Article 11), and to remove 
offsets on procurement.  
While the NPA removed inter-state price preferences by States agreeing not to apply them against 
each other, preferences remained against imports.
2
 New South Wales (NSW), Victoria (VIC), 
Queensland (QLD) and South Australia (SA) joined the Commonwealth in applying 20% margins, 
while Western Australia (WA) and Tasmania (TAS) applied 10% margins.
3
 The Commonwealth and 
VIC subsequently removed price preferences on imports in 1989. These price margins, together with 
the zero price margins adopted by NZ, VIC and ACT were subsequently incorporated into the NPA.  
Although the ANZCERTA extended the coverage of government procurement reforms to NZ 
suppliers in creating the single Tasman procurement market, the essence for the NPA was the 
unilateral removal of by Australia of inter-state preferences as part of domestic reform. The followed a 
report by the Australian Industry Assistance Commission, now called the Productivity Commission 
(PC), that showed preferences were penalizing the efficiency of the heavy engineering industry.  
Australia removed inter-state preferences some three years before NZ was granted the same 
treatment as Australian content. NZ’s accession to the NPA extended simultaneously reciprocal 
national treatment on price preferences to NZ suppliers. Australia therefore effectively extended 
discriminatory market access treatment to NZ via price preferences while NZ, which had no price 
preferences against imported content committed never to introduce any against Australian content  
In 1991, the NPA was re-named the Australian and New Zealand Government Procurement 
Agreement (ANZGPA).4  
a. The Government Procurement Agreement (ANZGPA) 
The ANZGPA, like the NPA, encouraged cooperation in government procurement and the elimination 
of inter-state preference schemes and other forms of discrimination based on origin. ANZ suppliers 
could compete on an equal footing for government contracts in all States and in NZ. The ANZGPA 
also fostered discussions to promote greater uniformity in procurement policies and practices eg 
common contractual, technical and performance standards and specifications. The ANZGPA and its 
predecessor, the NPA, as domestic legislation signed by both governments thus formed the basis of 
implementing the single Tasman government procurement market.
5
 Accession to the ANZGPA, like 
ANZCERTA, is closed to other governments. 
The ANZGPA covered Commonwealth, State or Territory bodies, statutory and non-statutory 
authorities, and government-controlled contracting bodies, but excluded procurement by local 
governments as well as by government-owned corporations, body corporate or other legal entities with 
the power to contract, unless the parties decided otherwise. Exemption from the application of 
                                                     
2
 State preferences applied only to goods and related services, not to just services. 
3
 The Australian Capital Territory (ACT) never applied preferences to its suppliers against other states or imported content.  
4
 Throughout this document to avoid confusion the WTO Government Procurement Agreement is referred to by the 
abbreviation ‘WTOGPA’ and the Australian Government procurement Agreement as the ‘AGPA’.  
5
 The ANZGPA is administered by the Australian Procurement and Construction Council (APCC), in which NZ has full 
participation rights. 
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preference margins but not from other provisions of the NPA for specified Commonwealth and State 
bodies, except VIC and the ACT, were dropped in the ANZGPA; New Zealand had made no such 
exemptions under the NPA. As per the NPA, certain classes of procurement were also exempt from 
specific provisions (Box 1). ANZ could exempt new developments in purchasing policy, or use that 
policy to implement other policies, provided there was no discrimination based on origin; and advance 
purchases to stimulate depressed industries.
6
  
Box 1: Specific exemptions from the ANZGPA 
Joint bodies with other governments; bodies funded mainly from special industry levies, community groups, 
special grants or public donations: and bodies competing substantially with the private sector if significantly 
commercially disadvantaged by applying the preferences.  
Procurement exempt from all provisions are: 
 from own Departments or authorities if no other supplier asked to tender, unless public tenders called 
irrespective of whether a government body tenders; and 
 in emergencies, e.g. natural disasters. 
Procurement exempt from specified provisions are: 
 dual or multiple sourcing based on sound and practical reasons not deemed to breach provisions 
prohibiting discrimination on origin; 
 proprietary items to ensure machinery or equipment integrity, and of proprietary equipment of a work, 
health or safety nature specified in industrial agreements (provisions on selective use of specifications), 
unless available from a number of sources and public tenders called; 
 strategic defence and other items affecting national security subject to provisions prohibiting 
discrimination but not subject to monitoring;  
 Australian governments in accordance with Commonwealth non-procurement policies deemed not to 
contravene the ANZGPA; and 
 when a local source is essential to ensure supply in case of a natural disaster or similar circumstances, and 
preferences are necessary for the viability of the local source, subject to unanimous agreement. 
The ANZGPA committed ANZ to provide services, products and suppliers equal opportunity and 
treatment no less favourable than that accorded to their own domestic products and suppliers, and to 
ensure no inter-State and trans-Tasman application of preference schemes and other discrimination 
based on origin. Origin is defined using the ANZCERTA rules. Thus, as for ANZCERTA and imports 
of goods generally, the rules-of-origin act as a non-tariff measure restricting trans-Tasman government 
procurement. This is because NZ goods not meeting these rules-of-origin are ineligible for receiving 
Australian State preferences and hence discriminated against as non-NZ content. 
The ANZGPA also called for promoting opportunities for ANZ suppliers to compete for 
government business based on value for money, and to avoid biased purchasing practices. It 
specifically excluded certain discriminatory or biased procurement practices which denied equal 
opportunity.
7
 Value for money became the primary determinant in procurement, which included 
quality, price, delivery and service support, using life-cycle or similar costing techniques, where 
appropriate.  
Australia, as under the NPA, met the ANZGPA’s national treatment obligation by extending State 
price preferences against imported content to NZ suppliers. Such price preferences continued not to 
apply to non-NZ imported content, thereby discriminating against it. The national treatment obligation 
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 These provisions were seemingly never used. 
7
 For example, designing tender specifications and issuing tender requests to exclude ANZ suppliers; biasing specifications 
towards or against particular firms’ products; the timing of tender opening and closing to prevent interested ANZ 
manufacturers developing proposals and submitting tenders; specifying quantities and delivery schedules reasonably 
judged to prevent ANZ firms meeting requirements; and adopting purchasing practices to avoid public scrutiny. 
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did not require Australia to remove its inter-state price preferences but rather that they apply also to 
NZ content. 
While it would have been preferable economically for Australia to extend such market access 
unilaterally to all trading partners (not just NZ), even without reciprocity, this was never 
contemplated. Reforming government procurement was seen mainly in the context of removing inter-
State price preferences and establishing the single Tasman market.  
b. Commonwealth Government Procurement 
Total Commonwealth procurement of goods and services in 2012-13 was $48.9 billion, comprising 
over 66,000 contracts. Almost two-thirds related to services. Of the total Commonwealth procurement, 
some 11% by value and 5.6% by number of contracts was contracted overseas in 2013-14, mainly 
covering goods and services unavailable domestically. Thus, some 89% was likely to be procured 
domestically in 2013-14 (up from 82% in 2012-13 when 92% of services were likely to have been 
sourced from Australian suppliers and 70.1% of goods).
8
 Rather detailed centralized statistics are 
available on Commonwealth government procurement.  
Over the past three years, the Commonwealth has purchased 93% of services from Australian 
suppliers (totalling $60.2 billion) and 60% of goods (totalling $28.7 billion). Much of the overseas 
procurement covered large military contracts for goods not produced domestically. Some half, by 
value, of Commonwealth procurement covers defence. 
Commonwealth procurement was decentralized from the outset by devolving purchasing 
responsibilities to the procuring entities. Commonwealth Procurement Guidelines (CPGs) were first 
issued in 1998 under the Financial Management and Accountability (FMA) Act 1997. These were 
replaced by Commonwealth procurement Rules (CPRs) in December 2008. Commonwealth 
procurement was always underpinned by the core principles of value for money (on a whole-of-life 
basis), supported by efficiency and effectiveness; accountability and transparency; ethics; and industry 
development. Procuring entities have to consider the commercial and practical benefits of buying from 
competitive ANZ industries in evaluating value for money, and ensure that procurement methods do 
not discriminate against them, especially SMEs.  
Key principles now also cover encouraging competition, risk management, and procurement 
methods. Value for money remains the core procurement rule, but is to also consider the non-financial 
costs and benefits of procurement. Suppliers must be treated equitably and not be discriminated 
against irrespective of size, degree of foreign affiliation or ownership, location, or origin of their goods 
and services. Provisions also exist on ethical and non-corrupt behaviour and procurement, and to 
ensure accountable and transparent processes. 
The Department of Finance is responsible for the CPRs, which apply to all goods and services as 
well as procurement by all agencies falling under the FMA Act 1997 and prescribed bodies under the 
Commonwealth Authority and Companies Act 1997. CPRs were last updated in July 2014. They 
exclude procurement to maintain or restore international peace and security; to protect human health; 
essential security; and national artistic, historic or archaeological treasures. The new Public 
Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013, applied from July 2014, governs government 
procurement and includes CPRs as part of its rules. 
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 However, classifying Australian sourced goods and services, especially by the Commonwealth, may be overstated 
because the only means of identifying local sourcing is the tenderers’ Australian Business Taxation Number, and their 
business address. No information is available on the extent to which supplied goods and services is local content. Seeking 
further information from tenderers to determine local content shares would the Government believes add unreasonable 
complexity and ‘red tape’ to government procurement processes.  
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Commonwealth bodies have always had to source at least 10% of purchases from SMEs (ANZ 
firms with up to 200 full-time employees). Procurement practices should not unfairly discriminate 
against SMEs and provide them appropriate opportunities to compete. Determining value for money is 
to consider the benefits of contracting with competitive SMEs; barriers to entry that may prevent 
SMEs from competing eg costly preparation and submission of documents; SME capabilities and 
commitments to local or regional markets; and the potential benefits of having a larger, more 
competitive supplier base. 
In 2012-13, overall SME participation in Commonwealth procurement was 31.7% by value, well 
above the 10% target, and 60.5% based on the number of contracts awarded. Another 12% was 
contracted to small enterprises.  
Procurement above $5 million also has to take account of and the tender documentation reflect any 
industry development criteria and associated evaluation methodology, where appropriate, to extend 
opportunities for SMEs to participate. No procurement methods are stipulated but are decided by the 
procurement entity case-by-case. Tenderers for projects exceeding $5 million ($6 million for 
construction) in significantly populated indigenous areas must consider opportunities for these 
communities. 
The CPGs were substantially revised in 2005 to incorporate additional mandatory procurement and 
tendering procedures and rules on procurements at or above $80,000 for FMA agencies, and $400,000 
for relevant CAC Act Bodies (excluding construction services where the threshold is $7.5 million). 
These changes included in domestic legislation commitments agreed by Australia with the US in their 
Free Trade Agreement. Consistent with this Agreement, some specific procurement contracts 
exceeding the thresholds for FMA agencies and CAC bodies are exempt from these mandatory 
procedures (Box 2). For example, the exemptions for indigenous SMEs or suppliers primarily 
servicing disabled persons allows for direct contracting. 
Box 2: Procurement Exempt from Mandatory Procedures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These mandatory rules relate mainly to procurement processes and procedures eg a presumption for 
open tendering, when and under what conditions limited tendering could be used, and minimum time 
limits for tendering. By including these mandatory procurement procedures for generally non-
construction procurements exceeding AUD$80,000 into the CPGs/CPRs the Commonwealth 
 Real property or accommodation, excluding construction and goods and services procured 
 outside Australia for external consumption (including construction) 
 from another government entity if no commercial market exists or when legislation or Commonwealth 
policy requires using a government provider eg tied legal services;  
 by, or on behalf of, the Defence Intelligence Organisation, the Australian Signals Directorate, or the 
Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation; 
 from a business primarily providing services to disabled persons;  
 from a business that primarily exists to provide the services of persons with a disability; and  
of goods and services from an SME with at least 50% indigenous ownership funded by international 
grants, loans or other assistance, grants and sponsorship payments from non-Commonwealth entities;  
 directly for providing foreign assistance;  
 research and development services;  
 experts or neutral persons, including barristers, for current or anticipated litigation or dispute; 
 fiscal agency or depository services, liquidation and management services for regulated financial 
institutions, and sale and distribution services for government debt;  
 motor vehicles;  
 by the Future Fund Management Agency of investment management, investment advisory, or master 
custody and safekeeping services for the purposes of managing and investing the assets of the Fund;  
 blood plasma products, plasma fractionation services, government advertising services & labour hire. 
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effectively extended these procedures and processes in AUSFTA provisions to all of Australia’s 
trading partners. Thus, the Commonwealth effectively extends to all suppliers the same treatment 
which it has committed to under its PTA commitments on government procurement. But of course 
PTAs were not needed to achieve this outcome – it could have been better achieved by adopting these 
changes as part of a broadly-based unilateral, non-discriminatory procurement policy at the central 
government. Moreover, given the complexities of their procurement systems it is unclear if this is tnhe 
case for at least some States. 
Procurement-connected policies 
These are provided for in the CPGs/CPRs and cover Commonwealth policies where procurement has 
been identified as a means of delivery. There have proliferated in recent years to number 24 
administered among 11 Commonwealth departments (Table 1). The relevant policy-owning entity is 
responsible for administering, reviewing and providing information on the policy as required. These 
set special regulations that all suppliers to Commonwealth procurement must meet, including meeting 
other employment, worker disability and national codes or principles.  
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Table 1: Selected Procurement-connected Policies 
Procurement-Connected Policy Relevant Policy 
Agency 
Start 
Year 
Suppliers affected Minimum 
Threshold 
($million) 
Small 
(<20) 
SME 
(<200) 
Large 
(>200) 
Procurement On-Time Payment 
Policy for Small Business 
Finance 2012 X   Up to $1 
Competitive Neutrality Guidelines Treasury 2004 X X X  
Legal Services Directions Attorney General’s  2005 X X X $5 
Intellectual Property Principles for 
Australian Government Agencies 
Attorney General’s  2008 X X X  
National Code of Practice for 
Construction Industry 
Implementation Guidelines 
Employment 2013 X X X  
Protective Security Policy 
Framework 
Attorney General’s  2013 X X X  
Trade Sanctions Foreign Affairs & 
Trade 
2014 X X X  
Information, Communications & 
Information Systems Security 
Manual 
Signals 
Directorate, 
Defence 
2005 X X X  
Commonwealth Disability Strategy Social Services 2010 X X X  
Fair Work Principles (revoked 1 July 
2014) 
Employment 2010 X X X  
Workplace Gender Equality 
Procurement Principles and User 
Guide 
Employment 2013 X X X  
The National Code of Practice for 
Construction Industry 
Implementation Guidelines 
Employment 2013 X X X  
Australian Government ICT 
Sustainability Plan 
Environment 2010 X X X  
ICT SME Participation Procurement 
Policy 
Industry 2010 X X X $20 
National Public Private Partnership 
Policy Framework & Guidelines 
Infrastructure, 
Regional Australia 
2008 X X X $50 
Indigenous Opportunities Policy Prime Minister & 
Cabinet 
2011 X X X $5 
Australian Industry Participation 
Plans for Government Procurement 
Industry 2010 X X X $20 
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Policies to Assist Industry Participation in Procurement 
The Australian Industry Participation National Framework (AIP National Framework) was signed by 
Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments in April 2001. They committed to incorporating in 
their industry development policy the principles of full, fair and reasonable opportunity; free of 
interstate preferences; regional development; competitive neutrality; value for money; transparency of 
process; policy consistency; and consistency with Australia’s international obligations. In addition to 
the AIP National Framework, each state has its own industry participation policies aimed at 
increasing Australian industry participation in public and private sector investment projects. 
Some industry participation assistance schemes fall under the Australian Industry participation 
(AIP) programs administered by the Department of Industry. They are designed to encourage full, fair 
and reasonable opportunities for Australian industry to compete in major public projects. AIP 
programs have required since 2010 tenderers for Commonwealth procurement over $20 million to 
prepare and implement plans outlining proposed actions to provide Australian suppliers, especially 
SMEs, with opportunities.
9
 Requirements apply to all covered entities and have been adopted by some 
Commonwealth authorities and companies. The ICT SME participation procurement policy works the 
same for ICT contracts but requires higher AME participation of 20% for SME participation of the 
contract value for software/services levels (10% for hardware). 
Commencing in December 2013, all major projects, both public and private, with a minimum 
capital expenditure of $500 million must meet mandatory requirements (Australian Jobs Act 2013), 
which includes developing and implementing an AIP.  
The Defence Department’s procurement promotes Australian industry participation (Box 3).  
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 As at end-February 2014, six AIP plans had been approved. 
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Box 3: Defence Material Procurement 
Governments prefer directing defence capital expenditure to Australian-based firms t o  foster long-term, 
sustainable growth in the domestic defence industry. Hence, the Department of Defence's procurement 
policies and practices form part of a broader industry policy framework. Offsets or purchasing preferences are 
no longer used to procure capital equipment but industry is provided more detailed and timely information on 
Defence's future capital investment plans and operational aspects of its procurement policies and practices. 
Industry assistance is provided through a combination of: 
 carefully tailoring and closely monitoring direct grants or subsidies to Australian-based firms, typically in 
industry skilling, innovation and export market development; 
 adjusting timing of capital projects to assist Australian-based firms bridge gaps in their workload, if 
achievable at reasonable cost and within operational plans; 
 paying price premiums to build or maintain domestic industry capabilities of especially high military-
strategic value, in strict accordance with value for money; and  
 implementing and progressively strengthening procurement rules so that tenderers can fully explore 
opportunities for Australian industry participation, and to accept those that are competitive. 
These procurement rules are embedded in the Australian Industry Capability (AIC) Program. It differs 
from the AIP by eschewing the use of quotas or minimum targets to ensure domestic goods and 
services are properly considered. An AIC Plan must be prepared for procurement projects exceeding 
$20 million. The AIC Program's effects mainly acquisition projects where the comparative advantage 
of Australian-based firms is generally weakest. On average, capital equipment acquisition projects 
absorb around 30% of Defence's total in-country equipment spend. 
The Program also expressly provides that an AIC Plan be prepared for all procurement projects involving 
Priority Industry Capabilities (PICs). They are capabilities for building or supporting Defence capital 
equipment which, if not available in-country, are deemed to place at risk the nation's defence self-
reliance and operational needs. The PIC program is to maintain industry capability at the minimum 
level consistent with identifiable need. PICs are assessed within a value for money framework. 
Defence spends around $1O billion annually on acquiring and sustaining capital equipment. Most is in-country, 
averaging 50-60%. Defence expenditure accounts for 60% of all shipbuilding and repairs in Australia. 
c. State Government Procurement 
State governments have their own procurement policies. They generally utilize the same principles as 
the Commonwealth e.g. value for money, competition and non-discrimination, but do not necessarily 
implement them in the same way. The availability of detailed statistics on government procurement 
varies substantially between the states. Stater procurement systems have also evolved to be complex 
and cumbersome, full of ’red tape’, largely coinciding with efforts to remove relatively 
straightforward price preferences favouring local content with more hidden discretionary forms of 
discriminating against foreign content.  
(i) New South Wales (NSW) 
The NSW procurement system is decentralized; entities manage their own procurement. The 
Procurement Board administers the framework and associated regulations (Public Works and 
Procurement Act 1912). It develops and implements a government-wide strategic procurement 
approach; ensures best value for money (the overarching requirement); improves competition and 
facilitates access by the private sector, especially SMEs and regional enterprises; reduces 
administrative costs of procuring agencies; and simplifies procurement processes while ensuring 
probity and fairness.  
Procurement by all agencies and prescribed state-owned corporations are covered. Also are goods 
and services (including construction) procured by or for an agency to either exercise statutory 
functions or pursuant to statutory procurement powers. Procuring entities must follow the Board’s 
Government Procurement Polices Across the Tasman; What Role Played by (Preferential) Trade Agreements? 
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policies and directions; adhere to probity and fairness; and provide requested information on 
procurement. 
The Board has an Agency Accreditation Scheme to assess agencies’ capability to undertake 
different levels and/or types of procurement. They can generally only engage in procurement 
consistent with their accreditation. When the Scheme extended to construction accredited agencies 
will be able to procure services over $1.3 million.  
Price preference margins 
NSW until recently applied price preferences of 20% to goods and related services of ANZ origin. 
Margins applied on the imported content of all tenders claiming local content, and added to the 
tendered price used to evaluate tenders. Tenderers had to supply details of imported (non-ANZ) and 
local content and substantiate if required.  
NSW firms also received additional country location preferences of 2.5% or 5% under the Country 
Industries Preference Scheme (CIPS). This preference was added to all other tender prices after 
applying the 20% preference margin against overseas content. If an inter-state or NZ supplier was the 
preferred tenderer after applying the ANZ preference, no country preference was applied. If for 
tenders above $100,000 an Australian tenderer was not the lowest but was within 20% of the lowest 
tender (before application of preference), the responsible Minister could provide Australian tenderers 
an opportunity to reduce prices. Such Ministerial discretion could be exercised on significant 
purchases where the preference margin was insufficient for the Australian tenderer to win on price, or 
if it was believed circumstances warranted it. While the preference scheme recognised that the 
fundamental principle guiding procurement was to achieve best value for money, other factors also 
needed to be considered, such as technical performance, delivery, maintenance, and the NSW 
Government’s wider economic development and social objectives. The Price Preference Schemes 
applied to all bids exceeding $700,000.
10
 
While the ANZ Price Preference Margin and Country Industries Preference Scheme ceased for 
large enterprises from 2008 they continued for SMEs as permitted under the AUSFTA. NSW also 
extended other AUSFTA procurement commitments, including on procedures and processes, by 
extending the minimum AUSFTA thresholds on covered procurement (construction of $7.769 million 
and for goods and services of $551,000) so that suppliers from the parties were treated the same as 
domestic suppliers. NSW had also certain exceptions specified in AUSFTA from covered procurement 
e.g. health and welfare services, education services and motor vehicles.  
A new procurement scheme for SMEs called the Local Jobs First Plan was implemented from July 
2009.
11
 It improved SME opportunities to compete when providing ANZ content.
12
 It covered all 
goods and services, including ICT and consultancies, exceeding $700,000, and to all procurement 
methods.
13
 Agencies established specifications and evaluation procedures to provide ANZ-SME 
suppliers opportunities to compete on value for money, designed tendering procedures to minimize 
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 The 20% price discount applied to the ANZ-SME content in tenders. The discount was not based on whether the tenderer 
was an SME but rather applied on the ANZ-SME content. In addition the CIP price margin applied as appropriate, but 
not to services with no manufacturing component. Tender prices adjusted for price discounts were used to evaluate the 
tender. 
11
 ANZSMEs are firms employing up to 200 full-time equivalent persons. 
12
 ANZ-SME content was the value-added content sourced from ANZ-based SMEs. It included ANZ value-added in supply 
chains by SMEs where it could be shown, but excluded overseas-based value addition and/or imported content. Goods 
not made in New Zealand but imported via there and not meeting ANZCERTA rules-of-origin are not considered ANZ 
content. 
13
 The Plan excluded construction and related services; and community service grants, unless purchasing a service from 
State contracts or other prequalified panels.  
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costs to tenderers, and included SME participation as tender criteria. For contracts from $1 million to 
$4 million, agencies also ensured tenders included SME participation criteria that were weighted in 
tender evaluation. For tenders above $4 million, tenderers had to submit a SME participation plan 
(SMEPP) that included SME participation criteria. SMEPPs had a weighting in the tender evaluation 
of at least 6%.
14
  
The Local Jobs Plan was replaced in early 2013 by the NSW Government Procurement: Small and 
Medium Enterprises Policy Framework. It is intended to increase government business opportunities, 
support competition, reduce administrative burdens for SMEs, maximise their access to government 
procurement opportunities to win public business, and to deal more easily with government. Agencies 
must improve SME access to procurement opportunities by taking reasonable steps to obtain at least 
one written quotation from a prequalified SME supplier for contracts up to $1 million.  
Price preferences for ANZ-SME content were removed. However, procuring agencies instead have 
to develop SME Opportunity Statements on the impact their procurement has on SMEs. The threshold 
for having to submit SMEPPs on how tenders will support local industry was also raised from $4 
million to $10 million. They are still considered in the tender evaluation and, if successful, become 
part of the contract.  
Open public tenders are no longer legislatively mandated as the default form for procuring goods 
and services. Procurement processes must be probity rich and transparent, suitable to the particular 
purchase, and have appropriate regard for policy and trade agreements. 
The Government supports purchasing opportunities for businesses employing disabled people. 
Provisions simplify purchasing of some goods and services for directly engaging disability 
employment organisations, subject to achieving value for money. Agencies can buy goods and 
services up to $150,000 from a recognised Aboriginal business, provided the suppliers’ prices are 
reasonable and consistent with normal market levels, and at least one written quotation is obtained.  
(ii) Victoria (VIC) 
The Government Purchasing Board (VGPB) was established in 1995 under the Financial Management 
Act 1994. It develops procurement policy and practice. Since inception, VGPB’s has led government 
procurement of goods and services to deliver value-for-money. In particular, it also develops 
procurement capability; minimises risk; and enables all businesses to access procurement 
opportunities. It monitors departmental compliance with procurement policies and Ministerial 
directions and reports irregularities to the relevant Minister.  
VGPB policy and practices apply to all Government departments, Victoria Police and to 12 
specified administrative offices. They do not extend to government business enterprises; construction; 
non-contractual agreements or any form of assistance including grants, loans, equity infusions, fiscal 
incentives, subsidies, guarantees, co-operative agreements and sponsorship arrangements; and 
purchasing arrangements associated with a project undertaken in accord with the Partnerships Victoria 
policy; and property (land) transactions. 
Procurement methods include open, selective, and limited tendering as well as quotations for 
procurement up to and including $150,000. Larger procurement is to be let by open or selective tender 
unless subject to an exemption. The rules were revised to incorporate the provisions of Australia’s 
PTAs, most notably with the US. For example, exemptions from conducting open or selective tenders 
to engage by limited tender incorporate the Agreement’s provisions as does the list of procurements 
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involvement in supply chains. 
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exempt from VGPA rules, and applying the minimum number of days for an open tender to close, are 
extended for covered procurement exceeding the agreed value thresholds.  
Procurement policies seek to maximize opportunities for local suppliers ie the achievement of a 
desired procurement outcome at the best possible —not necessarily the lowest price— price based on 
a balanced judgement of relevant financial and non-financial factors. Competition and contestability 
are seen as important drivers to achieving value for money. The significant costs of tendering 
especially for SMEs are recognized, and the Government is committed to creating government 
procurement business opportunities for SMEs.  
Departments must consider non-metropolitan regional suppliers if they offer at least the same value 
for money.  
The Victoria Industry Participation Plan (VIPP) 
The VIPP encourages bidders for government contracts to use local suppliers, including SMEs, in 
delivering procurements. It is concerned with procurement activity where the goods and services are 
considered contestable and competitive international and ANZ markets exist. The VIPP is 
administered by the Industry Capability Network (ICN) Victoria. The ICN certifies VIPPs prepared by 
short-listed bidders, and assists them in preparing VIPP Plans, under strict probity arrangements. In 
2013-14, ICN secured orders of $22 million for local industry under the VIPP.  
VIPP processes cover procurement wholly or partially funded by Government equal to or above $1 
million in regional VIC and $3 million in Melbourne. Procurements must be registered on the VIPP 
Management Centre website when the ICN advises if the activity has contestable items. If so, 
shortlisted bidders must prepare VIPPs detailing ANZ content.
15
  
From 2013 a 'contestability assessment' introduced focuses on procurement of 'contestable' goods 
and services where local suppliers compete with international firms, to promote local business 
opportunities without compromising value for money but to avoid the costs to bidders in completing 
VIPP plans on projects that by their nature will be delivered locally.
16
  
No VIPP Plans are required for activities assessed with no or limited contestability procurements 
(no competitive international suppliers or local suppliers). The agency must still meet the VIPP’s 
objectives and record the estimated local content of shortlisted suppliers. If assessed as a contestable 
procurement (competitive local and international suppliers), the standard VIPP process applies and 
shortlisted suppliers must provide an ICN-certified VIPP Plan. The Government can also declare 
projects and procurement as strategically significant to the VIC economy if over $250 million or more, 
or have capital costs of at least $100 million. The Government can then set minimum local content 
requirements and other conditions on the delivery of outcomes for local industry. During 2013-14 the 
eight declared strategic projects exceeded $11 billion and committed to an average local content of 
over 84%.  
In 2013-14, the contestability of 399 contracts, worth over $5 billion, were assessed, of which 216 
contracts (valued over $2.5 billion) were found contestable and required shortlisted bidders to submit 
VIPP plans (Box 4). Of the rest that had no or limited contestability, 85% were found to be local by 
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 VIPPs also contains details on number of new jobs created and existing jobs retained; introduction of new technology, 
opportunities for skills transfer and employee training; number of new apprentices/trainees engaged those retained. 
16
 The revised guidelines also enhanced details on suppliers’ opportunities by requiring ICN Victoria to provide agencies 
and shortlisted bidders a list of 'contestable' goods and services on specific procurement activities, highlighting 
opportunities for local firms early in the procurement process by being included ion the tender request. A new electronic 
VIPP with improved assistance features for businesses and agencies was also added, along with more robust monitoring 
and reporting requirements to demonstrate the local content outcomes achieved through the VIPP’s implementation, 
including introducing post-contract verification process.  
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nature ie items tendered were only available locally with low international competition. The remainder 
were assessed to be international by nature with products or services being unavailable locally. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(iii) Queensland (QLD) 
QLD’s procurement policy focuses on value for money, determined by price, non-price eg social and 
economic objectives (eg sustainability, regional development and employment, fitness for purpose, 
quality, service and support) and cost-related factors eg whole-of-life costs and transaction costs. 
Procurement policy aims to help regional development and competitive local businesses by 
encouraging agencies to buy locally. QLD had already removed its 20% price preferences on 
government procurement for ANZ local content. 
Goods and services can be procured by several means, including open, selective and limited 
tendering. QLD’s SME procurement policy, which includes ANZ businesses, aims at providing local 
industry full, fair and reasonable opportunities to obtain major work. The QLD procurement market is 
around $6 billion annually. 
Industry Capability Network Queensland (ICN Queensland)  
This is a free government-subsidized service to increase local content and industry participation in 
procurement, working to reduce imports and maximise opportunities for local industry. It identifies 
Australia’s best products, services, capabilities and capacity to competitively meet private and public 
sector procurement needs. ICN provides information to support government priorities for QLD jobs 
and building regions. It evaluates local capability across many industries to assist firms raise the local 
content of their tenders. 
ICT SME Participation Scheme  
This Scheme applies to ICT procurement by all agencies and assists ICT SMEs gain greater access to 
public contracts. Following recent revisions, any procurement must have at least one capable SME 
shortlisted in evaluating tenders, and at least two SME offers for contracts between $150,000 and 
$250,000uired or apply an SME participation score.
17
 Larger contracts require an SME participation 
score and a Procurement Plan. Agencies can also now directly engage SMEs to provide innovative 
solutions up to $500,000.  
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 The SME participation score is used to rank tenders, whereby the score contributes 10% to the final tender score. The 
tenderer with the highest participation level is given a score of 10, with the remaining tenderer’s scores being assigned as 
a proportion of 10. SME participation levels are calculated on the net proportion of the contract which is to be paid to 
SMEs. 
Box 4: Contestable Projects 
Of the 216 ‘contestable’ contracts requiring VIPPs 163 (worth $1.68 billion) commenced in 2013-14. 
Successful bidders committed to using 84.1% local content on average, representing $1.41 billion in local 
orders, creating 1,282 new jobs and retaining a further 5,103 existing jobs. The contracts are also expected to 
create 214 new, and retain 606 existing, apprenticeships/traineeships across Victoria. Activities covered 
included infrastructure works, purchase of medical equipment, construction of schools and supply of IT 
equipment. In 2013-14, 324 SMEs were reported to have prepared VIPP plans. During 2013-14, 128 contracts 
worth $948 million were reported completed. Most contractors claimed to have at least achieved their local 
content commitments. Average local content commitment planned was 90.2%, and contractors reported an 
aggregated local content outcome of 90.2%. A total of 1,111 new jobs were created in Victoria. 
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Procurement Transformation Program (PTP) 
A revised procurement policy, PTP, was released in 2013 that essentially reinforced previous 
arrangements. In place until end-2015, it aims to better implement the policy and design whole-of-
government better-practice procurement processes. Procurement is still being used to advance the 
government’s economic, environmental and social objectives.  
Queensland Government Building and Construction Training Policy 
This policy replaced the Indigenous Employment Policy for QLD Government Building and Civil 
Construction Projects (IEP), and the Building and Construction Contracts Structured Training Policy 
from July 2014.
18
 It supports employment and skills development in QLD's building and construction 
industry, and focuses on increasing the economic independence of indigenous people. All departments 
and statutory bodies must comply on public building projects of at least $500,000 and civil 
construction projects of $3 million or over. Eligible projects include those in specified indigenous 
areas.  
For indigenous projects, the 10% share of the total labour hours required for training must be met 
by indigenous apprentices, trainees and workers. An extra amount, equivalent to 10% of the total 
labour hours (which equates to a minimum of 3% of the estimated project value for building projects 
and a minimum of 1.5% of the estimated project value for civil construction projects) must be 
allocated to an agreed Indigenous Economic Opportunities Plan. This sets minimum agreed outcomes 
and provides flexibility so the project’s local economic opportunities can be maximised. 
Procuring agencies can select building or civil construction projects outside specified indigenous 
areas as indigenous projects if they are proposed as indigenous projects; specifically for use and 
benefit of indigenous people; located in a specified priority regional area; or agreed between with the 
Director-General of DATSIMA. 
Charter for Local Content 
This provides all businesses with full, fair and reasonable opportunities to tender for procurement. It 
covers all goods and services, including construction, but excludes ICT. It does not mandate agencies 
to use local suppliers but provides a mechanism for them to effectively and efficiently consider a wide 
range of potential suppliers. The Charter supports agencies to embed local content within procurement 
seen to support the objective of value for money by also encouraging greater competition; providing 
market opportunities for local firms; and demonstrating equivalence with private sector best practice. 
Procurements subject to the Charter include those with a government contribution exceeding $5 
million, or $2.5 million in regional QLD; Public Private Partnerships for projects and capital asset 
acquisitions exceeding $5 million; strategically significant purchases set by the procuring agency eg in 
an area of high unemployment or affected adversely by economic or other events eg natural disaster; 
and infrastructure projects with Commonwealth funding via the QLD Government exceeding $20 
million. 
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 The IEP, introduced in 2001, applied to all civil construction, and building construction projects above $250,000. It 
required at least 20% of total labour hours to be supplied by indigenous workers in nominated indigenous areas, with half 
of these hours to be accredited training. The Structured training Policy required a minimum of 10% of the total labour 
hours on any Government building or civil construction project (over $250,000 for buildings or $500,000 for civil 
construction) be met by indigenous workers, apprentices, trainees or cadets or used for the up-skilling of existing 
employees (to a maximum of 25%). It covered all QLD areas except the indigenous areas specified in the IEP.  
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(iv) South Australia (SA) 
In 2013-14, the SA government procurement market was about $4 billion, of which about 70% was 
services. Competitive tendering processes covered some 61% of contracts (89% by value); the rest 
was let mainly by direct negotiation (limited tendering). Most (96%) of all contracts were let to ANZ 
suppliers (98% by value); over two-thirds of total contracts were with SA suppliers (80% by value) 
and only 4% (2% by value) were let overseas. The share, by value, of contracts with SA suppliers rose 
from 42% in 2011-12 to 51% in 2012-13.  
The State Procurement Board began overseeing procurement by public authorities in 2005 (State 
Procurement Act 2004). It facilitates strategic procurement by agencies; reviews policies, principles 
and procurement guidelines; develops, issues and reviews standards for electronic procurement; and 
investigates and reviews compliance with policies.  
Procuring agencies are to obtain value for money; treat participants ethically and fairly; and ensure 
probity, accountability and transparency. Value for money involves determining the extent to which 
proposals will optimally deliver whole-of-life cost and quality (non-cost) factors, and contribute to 
government priorities.  
The Industry Participation Policy (IPP) 
A new IPP policy started in July 2012 was updated in 2014 to make local jobs, investment and 
supplier inputs critical to procurement. The Government is committed to ensuring that capable State 
SMEs receive full, fair and reasonable opportunities to be considered for major public and private 
works. The IPP is not intended to alter the prime goal of value for money, but to ensure this is assessed 
mindful of the contract’s broader impact on SA, including to local industry, especially SMEs eg on 
employment; industry capability and capacity via investment; retention of state economic activity and 
additional value-adding activities, innovation; and supply chain development. The IPP does not 
mandate local content levels or preferential treatment of ANZ suppliers eg by price preferences.  
The IPP covers all expenditure by public authorities prescribed under the State Procurement Act 
2004 exceeding $22,000, including on infrastructure and construction; Public Private Partnership 
projects; Federally-funded infrastructure and construction projects managed by the SA Government; 
and private sector projects with significant SA Government support (over $2.5 million cash and in-
kind).  
While no specific requirements exist for tenders under$22,000, agencies are to use local businesses 
where possible and encourage winning tenderers to use local SMEs. For contracts between $22,000 
and $220,000 where a minimum of three quotes are being sourced, at least one must be from SA. 
Between $220,000 and $4 million ($1 million in regional SA) agencies are to use the Industry 
Capability Network (ICN) Gateway database.  
For contracts of $4 million and over, but below $50 million (or $1 million and above in regional 
areas), tenderers must submit standard Industry Participation Plans (IPP). These must identify how 
they will provide full, fair and reasonable opportunities for local SME’s to compete for contracts or 
participate in major public and private sector projects, or more specifically to consider products and 
capabilities provided by local SME’s; promote economic contribution to the state including 
employment and growth; and monitor and record SME involvement.
19
  
For contracts of $50 million and over and projects (regardless of value) declared by the SA 
Government as ‘Strategic’ (in accordance with the IPP criteria), tenderers must prepare a tailored IPP. 
It will include a detailed methodology to identify and consider local SME participation, and 
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will receive a zero score for the IPP weighted criteria. For contracts above $10 million an IPP is mandatory.  
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information on additional economic benefits for the SA economy. It should also give opportunities to 
involve local SMEs in value-added research, design work and advanced services. 
The IPP is considered through a weighted evaluation criterion in awarding tenders. The assessment 
criteria will vary depending on the nature of the procurement but will typically include the number of 
jobs and the value of investment in SA directly linked to the contract; the approach to consider SME 
involvement through supply chain opportunities; and the tenderer’s record in meeting IPPs. The 
procuring agency sets the weighting subject to a general minimum 5%, and 10% for heavy and civil 
engineering construction; professional, scientific and technical services; non-residential construction; 
and electrical equipment. 
In 2014, an Employment Contribution Test (ECT) was added for procurements above $22,000 up 
to $4 million in Adelaide, and $1 million in regional SA. Agencies must first determine if the procured 
goods and/or services are available within SA. If so, all tenderers must provide the number of labour 
hours associated with the primary contract and any sub-contracts. For such procurements in Adelaide 
the ECT receives a minimum 5% weighting in the tender evaluation. In regional SA, it is intended that 
at least 15% of the jobs from the procurement will go to local people. On specific procurements a 15% 
weighting will apply, and can be higher in particular areas to provide greater flow-on regional 
economic benefits.  
While the same IPP’s weighting apply to procurements above $50 million, a merit assessment is to 
determine the appropriateness of the minimum weightings. For these contracts the OIA will advise on 
the higher weightings (above the minimum levels) for the IPPs; help develop a template for a Tailored 
IPP; and initiate identifying SME opportunities.  
In all procurements with an ECT or an IPP the agency or Government can raise the mandatory 
minimum weightings based on the proposal’s merit eg potential exists for significant economic and 
social benefit to SA, or to specific regions, including employment, investment and supply-chain 
benefits. Factors to be considered in lifting the weighting include whether the activity is in an area or 
sector of the economy with high unemployment and/or low socioeconomic standing; a local supplier 
exists which may replace imports; can stimulate a local industry still developing or in decline; 
provides skills transfer or up-skilling of local workers; and offers capital investment with long term 
SA benefits.  
(v) Western Australia (WA) 
In 2012-13, Tenders WA recorded 4,760 agency-specific contracts, totalling $7.58 billion (goods, 
services and infrastructure). About $5 billion was spent on WA suppliers under the State’s Buy Local 
Policy.  
The State Supply Commission (SSC) delegates purchasing and contracting authority to agencies 
(State Supply Commission Act 1991). Procurement must achieve best value for money. Agencies must 
align its procurement with Government policies, objectives and strategies, and actively support whole-
of-government initiatives. Cost and non-cost factors must be considered. The value for money test 
may vary in complexity depending on the purchase, from a simple price assessment for low value 
highly commoditized goods or services, to a detailed assessment. 
Direct purchase and verbal quotations are allowed for procurement up to $50,000 ($20,000 before 
July 2014). Written quotations are needed for contracts up to $250,000 (previously $150,000). For 
contracts above $250,000 ($150,000 before July 2014) open and effective competition must provide 
suppliers with fair and equitable access while maintaining transparency and integrity. These minimum 
requirements may be waived eg buying from an indigenous business up to $250,000 ($150,000 before 
1 July 2014) or from businesses primarily providing services of disabled persons.  
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Buy Local Policy 
Operating this since 2001 it maximizes opportunities to develop both WA and Australian businesses 
while gaining value for money. The Policy has initiatives and price preferences to enhance local 
business opportunities in procurement. Agencies must give priority to indigenous tenderers and 
consider implementing indigenous employment strategies.  
Agencies’ requests for quotation or tender must reflect local business capability and recognise local 
content in evaluating bids. Tenders of $750,000 and above must have a local content evaluation 
criterion with a minimum 20% weighting. Social, economic, environmental and regional development 
impacts are also to be considered. Agencies are encouraged to use a similar approach on smaller 
contracts. The intent is to select contractors supporting local WA businesses offering value for money 
tenders. A minimum local purchasing target of 80% applies.  
Price Preferences 
There are two price preferences, namely the Imported Content Impost (ICI) and the Regional Price 
Preferences (RPP). ICI requires agencies to apply a 20% price impost to non-ANZ goods and related 
services. Two RPPs apply, namely the Regional Business Preference (RBP) and Regional Content 
Preference (RCP). RBP applies to eligible regional businesses within a prescribed distance from a 
regional purchase or contract point of delivery to the total bid value. RCP applies, under certain 
circumstances, to all WA tenderers buying services or materials from regional businesses for use in 
regional contracts. RCP applies to the cost of services or materials bought from businesses located in 
the prescribed distance, and used to deliver the contract. Due to the ANZGPA, when bids received 
from inter-state or NZ suppliers are being considered the RCP and RBP do not apply.  
The RBP and RCP price margins are 10% for the total cost of goods and services (up to $50,000) 
and 5% (up to $50,000) for Housing and Works Purchases. Chief Executive Officers can raise these 
caps on individual procurements where further support to regional businesses offers demonstrated 
economic benefits. In July 2013, RPP caps were raised to $250,000 each, and the total maximum 
preference claimable to $250,000 for goods and services, and $500,000 for housing and works.  
From December 2009, the application of these price preferences was amended to comply with 
Australia’s PTAs, including with the US. Local content weightings for awarding tenders were 
removed on covered procurements for US and Chilean businesses ie such imported content is treated 
like ANZ content. 
Building Local industry Policy 
This Policy maximizes procurement opportunities for local businesses and creates employment 
opportunities. An Industry Participation Plan (IPP) must be prepared for all public projects over $20 
million or where the capital equipment exceeds $1 million.
20
 It intends building a project-wide 
procurement strategy by providing WA industry with full, fair and reasonable opportunity.
21
 IPPs 
should describe the project’s direct economic impact on WA industry via employment, skills transfer, 
strategic alliances and regional development; the type, number of and size of procurement packages 
and/or eligible goods; clearly state how the proposal will maximise use of competitive local business. 
                                                     
20
 An IPP may be needed on smaller projects eg if potential exists for low levels of local industry participation due to the 
firm being new to WA; the supply chain of the lead contractor excludes WA suppliers; involves skills or knowledge sets 
prioritized by WA; is in a region targeted for development; and potential exists for regional employment.  
21
 The IPP should try to ensure all project participants gain a greater knowledge of WA capabilities by brokering linkages 
between project proponents, the contractors involved in the project, domestic and global supply chains and WA industry. 
It needs to support longer-term industry development objectives by encouraging consortia building and strategic 
partnering among local firms, and by facilitating the integration of Australian industry into domestic and global supply 
chains. In addition the IPP should also address the economic impact of the project.  
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The Policy applies to all WA Government purchasing, including using a local content selection 
criterion with a 20% minimum 20% weighting in evaluating public tenders of $750,000 or more. 
Special focus is to be given to promoting the local indigenous participation.  
The Industry Capability Network WA, a joint industry government initiative, helps enhance global 
competitiveness of purchasers, while supporting local industry participation. It advises agencies on 
WA industry capacity and competitiveness. Since implementing the framework in July 2011, contracts 
worth some $60 billion have been won by local suppliers. 
(vi) Tasmania (TAS) 
Procuring agencies must pursue value for money by obtaining the best price after weighing up the 
purchase’s costs and benefits. Value for money factors are to be specifically included in the evaluation 
criteria, and can include the contribution to government policy objectives of supporting local and 
regional business by fostering industry development and job creation. Procurement must be impartial, 
open and encourage competitive offers using transparent non-discriminatory processes. 
Agencies must ensure local businesses can participate in procurement, and adopt the Government's 
Buy Local Policy requirements. They do not provide preferences but must actively seek local bids and 
ensure that processes do not unnecessarily preclude local businesses from bidding or disadvantage 
local suppliers.  
Procuring agencies can receive direct quotes to buy goods and services at or below $50,000. They 
must seek at least three written quotations for larger contracts up to $250,000, unless granted approval 
for direct/limited tendering for ‘covered procurement’ under Australia’s PTAs, or for other 
procurement if the costs to the agency and suppliers of seeking quotations or calling public tenders 
would outweigh the value for money benefits, or where exceptional circumstances exist justifying the 
use of direct/limited tendering. Where local capability exists, at least one quotation must be sought 
from a TAS business. It is expected that direct/limited sourcing will be rare.  
Agencies may directly procure from businesses mainly providing services to disabled people. If 
activated, the mandatory requirement to seek three written quotations or to call open tenders can be 
waived.  
Buy Local Policy 
This provides mandatory procurement planning requirements, a local benefits test, and industry 
participation plans (IPPs). On procurements exceeding $50,000 agencies must submit a pre-
procurement local impact assessment ensuring local suppliers can participate with success. For smaller 
contracts, the impact on local suppliers is to be assessed. Agencies must ensure the planning process 
and procurement specifications do not disadvantage local SME suppliers, and disaggregate all 
substantial procurement opportunities unless exempted.
22
 This may be granted where the benefits of 
aggregation clearly outweigh the potential negative impact on local SMEs or the local economy.  
Suppliers must prepare IPPs for tenders exceeding $5 million, and may be required on smaller 
projects over $2 million. The agency must approve IPPs. For private sector projects over $5 million 
with government support of $500,000 or more, the funding agency must ensure an IPP is prepared. 
Executive Summaries of IPPs are published by Treasury.  
Agencies must request suppliers provide a Local SME Industry Impact Statement for procurements 
of or above $2 million, or $5 million if the agency has decided that no IPP is required.
23
 The 
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 Any combined contract of $250 000 or more. Under this level, disaggregation is at the agency’s discretion.  
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 Local SMEs are ANZ businesses with below 200 employees.  
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evaluation criteria for contracts over $50,000 must include the local SME industry impact statement or 
the IPP. While voluntary, suppliers not submitting these plans and IPPs will receive zero weighting. 
The weighting is set by the agency of at least 10%.  
3. New Zealand (NZ) Government Procurement Policies 
The NZ Government spends annually some NZ$38-40 billion on goods and services, including 
infrastructure. Each agency conducts its own procurement. NZ started reforming government 
procurement in 2009 to achieve cost savings; build capacity and capability of procurers; enhance 
business participation; and improve governance, oversight and accountability. Aggregated 
procurement of selected common-use goods and services through “all-of-government” contracts was 
developed using “Centres of Expertise” in designated lead agencies. The Rules of Sourcing replaced 
the 2006 Mandatory Rules for Procurement by Departments from October 2013, and were reviewed in 
May 2014. Revised Rules are to be released shortly to align with internationally-recognised standards 
of the WTOGPA, which NZ has recently acceded, and commitments on government procurement in 
recent PTAs. The Rules on Sourcing are the Government’s standards of good practice for procurement 
planning, approaching the market and contracting. Centralized statistics on national government 
procurement do not appear to be readily available. 
The procurement rules are administered by the Ministry of Business, Innovation and employment 
(MIBE). They apply to all Public Service departments, the NZ Police, the Defence Force and from 
February 2015 all Crown Agents including district health boards.The rules cover contracts of at least 
$100,000 for goods and services ($10 million or more for construction). They promote value for 
money, which means considering also non-price factors eg total cost of ownership and other direct 
benefits. Contracts are to be let either to the tenderer with the best value for money over the whole-of-
life of the goods, services or works, or with the lowest price if price is the only criterion.  
Government is committed to open, transparent and competitive procurement with no discrimination 
against suppliers (domestic or international) by origin. The first Rule covers the key procurement 
principles applicable to all contracts, namely to plan and manage procurement; be fair to all suppliers; 
get the right supplier; obtain best deal for all; and to play by the rules. Fairness means treating all 
suppliers equally i.e. non-discrimination; giving NZ suppliers a full and fair opportunity to compete; 
and making it easy for all suppliers (small to large) to bid. Social, environmental and economic effects 
must be considered.  
Other Rules cover procurement integrity; no offsets; non-discrimination among suppliers based on 
foreign ownership or overseas business affiliations so that foreigners are treated no less favourably 
than NZ suppliers; protecting supplier’s information; requirements to openly advertise, unless 
exempted (Box 5);
24
 agencies annual submission to the MBIE of Strategic Procurement Outlooks and 
Procurement Plans. These rules help provide open and fair competition that supports innovation, and 
helps create a productive NZ supply base. Certain opt-out procurements apply from the rules but are 
still subject to the procurement principles.
25
 Open tendering is the default method for procurements 
over $100,000. 
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 If exempt from open advertising, the agency must use either a closed competitive process (with a limited number of 
known suppliers) or a direct source process (with a known supplier). Such exemptions cannot be used to avoid 
competition, protect domestic suppliers, or to discriminate against any domestic or international supplier.  
25
 Valid opt-out procurements include procurements between government departments, NZ Police or NZ Defence Force 
unless an open tender process is used; overseas for consumption abroad; for overseas offices; non-contractual 
arrangements; buying land or buildings; under conditional grants; funded by international aid, grant, loan or other 
assistance or that must comply with an international organisation’s procedure where that procedure is inconsistent with 
the Rules; certain types of public health, education and welfare services; Government’s central financial control 
functions; and procurement necessary to protect military and essential security and national defence interests as well as 
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NZ maintains procurement measures to accord more favourable treatment to the Maori population, 
including meeting the Government’s obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi. It also appears that 
limited price preferences of between 2% and 5% were applied by a few local governments to home 
suppliers on procurement, but it is unknown if they still exist (APEC, 2003). The NZ Government 
has no direct control over the procurement by local authorities, which varies. Central Government 
departments are directed to obtain from suppliers information on any local content they offer, but is 
intended only to enable agencies to consider any commercial and practical value for money 
advantages of local supply. Agencies are still expected to obtain the best value for money supplier, 
either domestic or international, based on their judgement of all costs and benefits (APEC, 2003). 
With the possible exception of some relatively minor local government procurement and 
preferential schemes for the indigenous population, the NZ procurement market has been open 
without discrimination to foreign suppliers, due to unilateral policy decisions.  
This situation contrasts sharply with the less transparent and more restrictive arrangements 
emerging in recent years in Australia, especially at the State level.  
4. Role of Trade Agreements 
ANZ belong to an increasing number of discriminatory bilateral and regional PTAs (so-called Free 
Trade Agreements or their equivalent) with government procurement commitments. Both have 
created a network of overlapping or criss-crossing PTAs with themselves and trading partners 
belonging to several agreements.  
Also while the WTOGPA is a multilateral plurilateral agreement within the WTO, it is like a 
series of PTAs because it is applies ‘conditional MFN’ and discriminates between WTO GPA 
(Contd.)                                                                  
maintaining international peace and human health eg arms, ammunition, war materials, peace-keeping deployment, and 
measures to protect: public morals, order or safety; human, animal or plant life or health, intellectual property, or relating 
to goods, services or works of persons with disabilities, philanthropic or not-for-profit institutions, and prison labour.  
Box 5: Exemptions from Open Advertising (Tender) 
These cover emergencies and if: 
 After an open tender advertised within the last 12 months where the contract’s core requirements are 
unchanged and no responses compliant with the pre-conditions or requirements (including quantity), 
or were only from suppliers verified to have colluded,; 
 Only one supplier exists of the goods, services or works and no reasonable alternative or substitute 
exists due to technical reasons preventing real competition, or procurement is of (i) intellectual 
property or associated (including patents or copyrights) or other exclusive rights or (ii) a work of art; 
 Goods, services or works are additional to original requirements and necessary for complete delivery 
where (i) the original contract was openly advertised (ii) changing supplier is impossible for economic 
or technical reasons, and would significantly inconvenience or substantially duplicate agency costs; 
 Buying a prototype for research, experiment, study or original development, including limited 
production or supply necessary to (i) perform field tests and incorporate the findings, or (ii) prove the 
good, service or works can be supplied in large numbers to an agreed quality (excluding production or 
supply to establish commercial viability or to recover research and development costs).; 
 Goods purchased on a commodity market; 
 Very short term purchases in exceptionally advantageous conditions (but not from regular suppliers; 
 Contracts awarded to design contest winners where it is organised consistent with the Rules and the 
judges know they will be awarded a contract, and have no conflict of interest; 
 Agency does not need to openly advertise contracts awarded by an established Panel of Suppliers; and 
 Agency receives an unsolicited unique proposal for goods, services or works not otherwise readily 
available in the market that aligns with government objectives, and is value for money.  
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members and other WTO Members. Moreover, while not a conventional ie binding trade agreement 
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) can be considered a trade agreement. Most ANZ 
PTAs are with other APEC economies.  
Government procurement commitments in ANZ’s trade agreements tend to use a positive list 
identifying those entities covered by the commitments (subject to minimum threshold values) and a 
negative list of measures and types of procurement that are excluded from the commitments, 
including national treatment. With the exception of APEC, they are also discriminatory as they are 
based on conditional MFN. 
(a) Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
This is a voluntary trade agreement comprising a large number of Asian and pacific economies, 
including the US and China, formed in 1989. APEC was based on the concepts of ‘open 
regionalism’, namely non-discrimination and concerted unilateralism. This, however, no longer is the 
case, especially given the proliferation of PTAs in the region and the widespread support that now 
exists to negotiate a discriminatory APEC PTA.  
APEC’s Non-binding Principles on Government Procurement were endorsed in 1999, including 
by ANZ. These cover key principles of value for money, open and effective competition, 
accountability and due process, fair dealing, and non-discrimination (Table 2). While 
conceptually covering all central and sub-central government procuring entities, the principles are 
non-binding. APEC economies had to choose to unilaterally apply them. Many APEC principles 
reflected those of the WTOGPA, although usually less prescriptively. 
Table 2: Summary of APEC Non-Binding Principles on Government Procurement 
Feature Description 
Value for 
Money (VfM) 
 
Procurement to achieve best VfM on a whole-of-life basis using comparative analysis of 
all relevant costs & benefits. Lowest price not necessarily best VfM. Must also consider 
factors like market maturity; performance history of prospective suppliers; relative risk of 
proposals; financial considerations; & contract options. Market approaches must specify 
relevant conditions for participation & evaluation criteria to properly identify, assess & 
compare costs & benefits fairly & equitably over the procurement cycle. 
Open & 
Effective 
Competition 
(OEC) 
 
Competition important for due process, fair dealing & VfM. OEC requires conducting an 
appropriate competitive process open & accessible to all suppliers. Bidding should be 
predictable & enable new entrants. Procurement procedures to encourage competition & 
non-discrimination, & to effectively address any limits identified to competition.  
Accountability & 
Due Process  
 
Governments must be accountable for procurement & officials answerable through clear 
lines of accountability & use of open & transparent processes. Due process & transparency 
important. Safeguards for individual rights; aggrieved suppliers to have rights to a fair 
hearing. Independent scrutiny facilitates accountability & due process. 
Fair Dealing (FD) 
 
FD is conducting business openly with full disclosure & no conflicts of interest or self-
dealing by officials. Procurement to be fair, reasonable & equitable with integrity. 
Commercially sensitive information to be secure. Ethical behavioural standards. 
Non 
Discrimination 
(ND) 
 
Transparency 
 
ND prevents bias for/against businesses or products. Suppliers assessed on ability to meet 
requirements using legal, commercial, technical & financial capacities, not excluded or 
denied equitable treatment due to their degree of foreign affiliation or ownership, location 
or size. Bids awarded on published criteria.  
Transparency assures procurements processes are appropriate & that policy & legislative 
obligations are met. It involves taking steps to support appropriate scrutiny of 
procurements. 
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ANZ helped formulate the APEC principles, which generally reflected and supported unilateral 
reforms implemented by from the mid-1980s. Thus, these principles were by and large common 
elements of their procurement arrangements, at least at the central level. Some Australian states 
especially and NZ local governments still maintained discriminatory price preferences against 
imported non-ANZ content. This reflected APEC’s voluntary nature and that the principles did not 
formally commit to national treatment or MFN.  
(b) WTO Government Procurement Agreement (WTOGPA)  
The WTOGPA is a plurilateral agreement formed among a sub-set of WTO members in 1996. A 
revised WTOGPA came into force in April 2014, but the practical value of these revisions would 
appear limited. Its key principles are conditional non-discrimination (national treatment on covered 
procurement and conditional MFN ie only between WTOGPA parties thus discriminating against 
non-parties), transparency, value for money, open and effective competition, including on the use of 
non-open tendering (Table 3).  
Unlike APEC, the WTOGPA is binding on and between those WTO Members that have joined, 
about to increase from 43 to 45 economies. It is thus a discriminatory agreement centred on 
conditional MFN. Its national treatment obligation that effectively banned price preferences for non-
developing countries is also conditional in that it only applies to covered procurement specified by 
each signatory ie the purchase of goods and services above the relevant threshold values specified for 
included procuring entities unless specifically exempted/excluded, of which there are many. Each 
party nominates the central, sub-central and other agencies along with the goods, services and 
construction services covered. Moreover, the offsets prohibition only applies to covered procurement.  
As Australia and until now NZ never joined the WTOGPA it had little direct impact on reforming 
their government procurement systems. NZ felt that the WTOGPA concessions were discriminatory, 
and that the regulatory burdens imposed by its procedural requirements placed overly prescriptive 
rules and guidelines on procuring agencies. Australia argued that the WTOGPA departed from the 
MFN principle; allowed bilateral agreements between signatories that carved out sensitive sectors; 
and set prescriptive procedural requirements at odds with State practices eg preferential price 
preferences. These criticisms against the WTOGPA remain equally valid today. 
(i) Australia 
The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) announced in November 2014 that 
Australia would work towards WTOGPA accession, implying that membership was highly likely 
(DFAT, 2014). Its view is that current arrangements are substantially compliant with the WTOGPA 
so that joining would require only a few changes (eg implementing effective, timely, transparent and 
non-discriminatory review procedures for suppliers and certain processes for pre-qualification and 
limited tendering) (DFAT, 2014).  
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Table 3: Summary of Key Provisions of the WTOGPA 
Provision Details 
Coverage & 
scope 
Measures affecting covered procurement, defined as buying goods & services, including construction, 
specified by each Member for non-commercial sale or resale by any contractual means (eg purchase, 
lease, rental, hire purchase) exceeding the specified threshold values by a non-excluded procurement 
entity. Members nominate the central, sub-central & other agencies covered (positive list). 
Exclusions Acquisition or rental of immovable property eg land, existing buildings; non-contractual agreements 
or any form of assistance eg cooperative agreements, grants, loans, equity infusions, guarantees & 
fiscal incentives; purchases of fiscal agency or depository services, liquidation & management 
services for regulated financial institutions or services related to the sale, redemption & distribution 
of public debt, including loans & government bonds, notes & other securities; public employment 
contracts; procurement specifically for foreign aid & assistance, under an international agreement for 
stationing troops or to jointly implement by the signatories a project or particular procedures or 
conditions of an international body, or funded by foreign grants, loans or other assistance. 
Security & 
general 
exemptions 
Action necessary to protect (a) essential national security or defence eg buying arms, ammunition or 
war materials. Cannot be used to discriminate arbitrarily or unjustifiably between Members where 
identical conditions prevail or as a disguised trade restriction (b) public morals, order or safety (c) 
human, animal or plant life or health (d) intellectual property or (e) goods or services of disabled 
persons, philanthropic institutions or prison labour. 
General 
principles 
Non-discrimination (national treatment) & conditional MFN: For covered procurement, each Member 
to accord immediate and unconditional treatment to goods, services & suppliers to each other (and 
among each other) no less favourable than the treatment of domestic goods, services & suppliers. 
Cannot treat local suppliers less favourably based on foreign affiliation or ownership or discriminate 
against a locally established supplier based on the goods or services offered by that supplier for a 
particular procurement are goods or services of any other Member. Effectively bans price 
preferences (except for developing countries as violating national treatment). 
Conduct Transparent & impartial manner; avoid conflicts of interest & prevent corrupt practices. 
Rules-of-
origin 
For covered procurement must apply the same rules-of-origin to goods or services from another 
Those applied in the normal course of trade with that Member. 
Prohibited Offsets (except for developing countries) 
Procurement 
forms 
Open & selective tendering, & limited tendering (cannot be used to avoid competition, discriminate 
against suppliers of other Members or to protect domestic suppliers) where (i) in the initial open 
tender no conforming tenders were submitted or suppliers satisfying conditions requested 
participation, or the tenders colluded (ii) a certain supplier can provide the goods or services & no 
reasonable alternative or substitute exists due to is for (a) a work of art (b) patents, copyrights or 
other exclusive rights (c) no competition for technical reasons (iii) for additional deliveries by the 
original supplier beyond the initial procurement if (a) changing suppliers is impossible for economic 
or technical reasons eg requirements of interchangeability or interoperability with existing 
equipment, software, services or installations procured under the initial contract (b) would 
significantly inconvenience or substantially duplicate costs; (d) only as strictly necessary due to 
extreme urgencies from events unforeseeable so that goods or services were unavailable in time 
using open or selective tendering; (e) goods purchased on a commodity market; (f) to procure a 
prototype or a first good or service developed in the course of, and for, research, experiment, study 
or original development, including limited production or supply to incorporate field testing results 
and to show the good or service can be supplied in quantity to acceptable quality standards ( 
excludes production or supply to establish commercial viability or to recover research and 
development costs); (g) very short term purchases under exceptionally advantageous conditions for 
unusual disposals eg liquidation, receivership or bankruptcy; (h) or where contracts are awarded to 
design contest winners provided it is organized consistently with the GPA’s principles eg publication 
of a notice of intended procurement and judged independently. 
Awarding 
contracts 
Unless shown not in the public interest, contracts to be awarded to suppliers assessed capable of 
fulfilling the contract’s terms & that based solely on the documentation’s evaluation criteria has 
submitted the most advantageous tender or the cheapest if price is the sole criterion. 
Thus Australia’s position on joining the WTOGPA has changed even though it still has the same 
weaknesses. This possibly reflects an ‘agreement addiction’ that now seems to exist in Australian 
trade policy setting which focuses on non-transparently negotiating non-MFN PTAs, including 
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discriminatory arrangements on procurement.
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 This has made joining a conditional MFN and highly 
selective plurilateral WTOGPA politically attractive, even though as with PTAs in general the real 
benefits to Australia are debatable. Governments have seemingly changed the onus of proof from one 
of joining a trade agreement only if there are proven economic benefits to joining a trade agreement 
regardless. This is despite the Productivity Commission’s conclusion that economic benefits are 
being oversold, based on publicly non-contested DFAT-commissioned dodgy economic modelling 
results, without any appreciation of the possible adverse impacts PTAs are having on Australia’s past 
unilateral trade policy successes, and to the multilateral trading system generally.  
Australia’s possible accession is unlikely to significantly change its procurement arrangements. 
There are many general exemptions allowed in the WTOGPA, and acceding to it will almost 
certainly see Australia negotiating substantial carve outs to enable continuation of discriminatory 
measures on non-covered procurement, including procurement benefiting SMEs and local content 
generally. Moreover, even for covered procurement the emergence of murky non-transparent 
measures and procedures in government procurement, especially by the States, are leading to more 
obscure and distorting forms of discrimination in practice that are very difficult to identify and curb. 
Australian DFAT claims that Australia has a world class government procurement system based 
on the principles of value for money, and non-discrimination that is already open to foreign 
competition is at best misleading. As this paper shows, Australian State and Commonwealth 
procurement has gone backwards in recent years, with less transparent schemes being implemented 
to raise local content, especially for SMEs. These murky arrangements help hide the extent to which 
government procurement schemes discriminate in practice against imported content. Such negative 
outcomes may also reflect the attention given by the WTOGPA and PTAs to banning price 
preferences as Australia positions itself by introducing other less transparent and more ‘legally’ 
acceptable measures to discriminate in favour of local suppliers. Of course this is de-reform. And if 
Australia is doing this it seems highly likely that other countries will be doing likewise. 
Unfortunately, DFAT’s misleading claims, which overlook the potential for significant bias 
towards local content in State and Commonwealth government procurement, indicates that Australia 
will not be using its likely WTOGPA membership as a vehicle for significant domestic reform. Most 
probably, the best outcome is likely for Australia to recycle in its accession negotiations its PTA 
commitments, especially from AUSFTA, which as shown below have also not promoted reform. 
Again other countries acceding to the WTO eg China will also probably follow the same defensive 
approach.  
DFTA’s pre-occupation with exports at the expense of domestic reform of Australia’s 
discriminatory government procurement arrangements favouring local content is evident in material 
so far released. It discusses only the benefits to Australian exporters of joining the WTPGPA. DFAT 
states that the Chinese government procurement market is around US$1.5 trillion and that as it is 
acceding to the WTOGPA Australia by joining would gain valuable future access to this market. 
However, based on experience such benefits appear largely illusory and must be kept realistic given 
what these negotiations are likely to achieve.  
Unless Australia is to use its accession to the WTOGPA in a way to reform its increasingly non-
transparent restrictive government procurement arrangements than the economic benefits to Australia 
are likely to be modest at best.  
Thus, decisions to enter trade agreements, including the WTOGPA, should be based on proper 
and independent assessments of the economic impact on Australia of negotiated outcomes. This is 
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 A common bureaucratic ploy for avoiding difficult or sensitive decisions is to refer the issue to a committee. This gives 
the pretence that a decision has been taken when that is not the case – a so-called ‘Clayton’s’ decision i.e. the type of 
decision made when not actually making a decision. One could easily be excused in thinking that the same motivation 
undermines many government decisions to rush into negotiating international agreements, including PTAs. 
Malcolm Bosworth 
26 
not done in Australia. Any such purported analysis is based on dodgy studies controlled by DFAT, 
usually done in advance based on ambitious liberalization outcomes that fall well short of actual 
negotiated outcomes, especially on market access abroad. By the time the details of negotiated 
outcomes are released publicly the negotiations have been concluded and signed. 
Thus in considering whether to join the WTOGPA (as with PTAs generally) it would be highly 
desirable if greater transparency of negotiated positions, including by Australia, occurred throughout 
the negotiations. A good starting point would be to have the question of Australia’s accession to the 
WTOGPA referred to a public inquiry by the independent Productivity Commission, the 
Government’s main advisor on trade and micro-reform initiatives. While DFAT and the Government 
would argue that such transparency would harm Australia’s negotiating positions, this is really a ruse 
for maintaining rigid domestic control over the negotiations. Their non-transparency (and 
discrimination) is appealing to governments. It enables them to make unconstrained/unchallenged 
inflated claims of economic benefits during the negotiations and to help secure a ‘trophy’ that they 
can boast about achieving Greater transparency would not only lead to better decision making in 
terms of Australian welfare by enhancing public scrutiny throughout the negotiations but also help 
prevent potentially damaging speculation being publicly developed which may be an incorrect 
understanding of what is happening in the negotiations. It could therefore muster public support for 
beneficial good PTAs, thus helping rather than hindering the government’s negotiations and ensuring 
that there are no hidden surprises in the final deal. 
(ii) New Zealand 
NZ formally applied for accession to the WTOGPA in September 2012, which was in October 2014 
(Table 4). Its offers largely reflect its commitments negotiated in NZ PTAs. 
The areas of possible relatively minor discrimination against foreign suppliers in government 
procurement, such as for indigenous population and by local government, are excluded from covered 
procurement. Also, some other types of government procurement have been excluded from coverage. 
To what extent these exist to provide cover for existing discriminatory or preferential practices in 
NZ, as opposed to simply being included in the negotiations for future ‘negotiating coin’ or to allow 
some future backsliding in these areas to introduce discriminatory practices, is unknown. Trying to 
gauge the openness of a country’s trade regime based on commitments in trade agreements is 
dangerous. Such commitments usually do little to improve the transparency of a country’s trade 
regime.  
Moreover, while price preferences and other more obvious discriminatory measures appear 
minimal in NZ, it is unknown whether the Government’s efforts to redress the perceived 
disadvantages faced by domestic firms, especially SME’s, in submitting competitive tenders and to 
promote local content, provide an advantage over imported content. For example, Departments must 
include in their internal documentation justification, signed off by senior management, the rejection 
of any NZ tender for contracts of NZ$100,000 and above (WTO, 2009). The Industry Capability 
Network NZ freely helps NZ firms, departments and public bodies identify major procurement 
opportunities currently or that would otherwise be imported that can be met competitively locally. As 
the Australian vase shows, such schemes can become murky and provide obscure discrimination in 
procurement against imported content that is difficult to identify.  
Nevertheless, subject to these qualifications, the NZ Government procurement market seems 
relatively open and non-discriminatory. If so, the main advantage for NZ of joining the WTOGPA 
would be to lock in via international commitments its unilateral liberal procurement policies. This is 
a positive outcome that could help limit backsliding. However, if there is significant ‘water’ in the 
commitments or areas of procurement excluded from the WTOGPA backsliding is facilitated. Also, 
since NZ has not backslid in its procurement policies without these international commitments the 
additional real value provided by the WTOGPA would seem overstated. Experience has shown that 
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the enforceability of these commitments in the WTO has been weak with very few dispute cases 
mounted. The best insurance against backsliding in procurement policies, as for other trade-related 
policies, is a firm unilateral commitment by governments to trade openness as good domestic 
economic policy irrespective of what protectionist policies other countries may follow.  
Table 4: Summary of NZ’s Commitments under the WTOGPA 
Feature Description 
Coverage  
Central Ministries of/for Primary Industries, Business, Innovation & Employment, Culture & Heritage, 
Defence, Education, Education Review Office, Environment, Foreign Affairs & Trade, Health , 
Justice, Māori Development, Pacific Island Affairs, Social Development, Transport, & Women's 
Affairs; Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority; Departments of Conservation, Corrections, 
Inland Revenue, Internal Affairs & Prime Minister and Cabinet; Crown Law Office, Government 
Communications Security Bureau; Land Information NZ; NZ Customs Service; Serious Fraud Office; 
State Services Commission; Statistics NZ; The Treasury; NZ Defence Force. & NZ Police.  
Sub-central District Health Boards of Auckland, Canterbury, Capital & Coast, Counties Manukau, Hutt, Mid-
Central, South Canterbury, Waikato, Waitemata, Bay of Plenty, & Southern; City Councils of 
Auckland, Wellington, & Christchurch*; & Regional Councils of Waikato, Bay of Plenty, Greater 
Wellington, & Canterbury*. Procurement by the listed District Health Boards through their agent 
healthAlliance Limited is covered. 
Other Accident Compensation Corporation, Careers NZ, Civil Aviation Authority, Energy Efficiency & 
Conservation Authority, Housing NZ Corporation, Maritime NZ, NZ Antarctic Institute, Fire Service 
Commission , NZ Qualifications Authority, NZ Tourism Board, NZ Trade & Enterprise,NZ Transport 
Agency, Sport NZ, Tertiary Education Commission, Education NZ, Airways Corporation of NZ Ltd, 
Meteorological Service of NZ Ltd, KiwiRail Holdings Limited, & Transpower NZ Ltd. 
Procurement by 
covered entities 
excluded 
Sub-central: covers only procurement by specified Councils of goods, services & construction for 
transport projects funded, at least partly, by the NZ Transport Agency. Other: This Agreement does 
not cover procurement by Accident Compensation Corporation of pension fund management, 
public insurance & fund placements, investments & financial services related to securities or trading 
on an exchange; by Sport NZ of goods & services containing confidential information related to 
enhancing competitive sport performance; & by Transpower NZ Ltd of electrical stringing services, 
tower painting services, & projects funded directly by private sector customers where those 
projects would not be undertaken except for the funding provided by those customers. 
Threshold 
values 
Central entities: goods SDR 130,000, services SDR 130,000, construction SDR 5,000,000; Sub-central 
entities: goods SDR 200,000, services SDR 200,000, construction SDR 5,000,000; Other entities: 
goods SDR 400,000, services SDR 400,000, construction SDR 5,000,000. 
Procurement 
excluded 
outright 
Research & development; public health, education, & welfare services; under contracts for 
construction, refurbishment or furnishing of chanceries abroad; outside NZ territory for overseas 
consumption; commercial sponsorship arrangements; a covered entity on behalf of a non-covered 
entity; a covered entity covered from another covered entity, unless tenders are called; for 
developing, protecting or preserving national treasures of artistic, historic, archaeological value of 
cultural heritage; & measures deemed necessary to accord more favourable treatment to Māori to 
meet obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi, provided measures are not used as a means of 
arbitrary or unjustified discrimination against other Members or as a disguised trade restriction (the 
Treaty’s interpretation, including as to the nature of the rights and obligations arising under it, are 
excluded from the Agreement’s dispute settlement provisions). 
The MBIE and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade jointly prepared a National Interest 
Analysis (NIA) of NZ’s membership of the WTOGPA (Box 6). However, this so-called analysis is 
far too general to be of much use in determining policy, and falls well short of what is needed for 
good policy analysis. The NIA, better called a Statement, only assumes NZ suppliers will be able to 
access the procurement markets of WTPGPA parties upon accession. It does not examine the actual 
degree increased openness in these markets for NZ nor the extent to which these opportunities will be 
realized by NZ exporters. Instead, large numbers of the size of procurement markets in WTOGPA 
members are given and summed, giving the mis-leading impression that a significant share of these 
markets will be opened. 
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Moreover, the flawed mercantilism export bias of the NIS is clear. Benefits are seen entirely as 
increasing NZ exports from greater overseas market access while liberalizing its own procurement 
market to overseas exporters is seen as a disadvantage, or cost, of joining the WTOGPA. The NIA 
also states as a positive economic outcome that WTOGPA membership will not constrain NZ’s 
ability to support local suppliers using non-preferential measures and other initiatives eg research 
grants or other incentives. This highlights the mis-placed emphasis on trade negotiation outcomes. 
Also, as NZ has negotiated access on this basis, it is only logical to expect that other WTOGPA 
parties have done likewise. Thus it is even less likely that WTOGPA accession will open up 
significantly Members’ government procurement markets to foreigners generally, including to NZ 
exporters. 
Indeed, the NZ Government’s stated objective of increasing exports to 40% of GDP by 2025 is 
economically flimsy. While a business growth agenda based on enhancing the efficiency of the NZ 
economy may well lead to increased export competitiveness and greater export share of GDP, it is a 
mistake to assume that higher exports per se automatically raise living standards. This depends on 
many factors, such as whether exports to new markets are diverted from existing markets, and where 
the resources to produce these exports come from. If, for example, the exporting activity is relatively 
inefficient and/or such sales are assisted so that resources are attracted from more efficient activities, 
Box 6: Summary of NZ National Interest Analysis on Joining the WTOGPA 
The NZ sees accession to the WTOGPA contributing to its Business Growth Agenda, specifically to 
increase exports to ‘40% of GDP by 2025’, which is seen as ‘necessary to lift economic growth and living 
standards.’  
The main benefit to NZ identified from membership is to secure for NZ businesses ‘legally guaranteed 
binding access to procurement markets of the existing WTOGPA Members, worth an estimated USD$1.7 
trillion annually, as well as ‘access to the government markets of new members without having to increase 
the access that NZ would have to provide.’ Other benefits identified include: 
 Address ‘some existing barriers overseas for NZ businesses accessing procurement sales eg some firms 
wanting to bid for US government contracts cannot always do so directly, being required to 
substantially transform their product in the US or sell it through a US intermediary’; 
 position NZ to seek ‘further access to procurement in future free trade negotiations’; 
 provide ‘opportunities to participate and influence the evolution of the WTOGPA’; and  
 provide mechanism for NZ and its businesses to resolve procurement disputes with WTOGPA parties.’ 
Disadvantages identified of joining the WTOGPA are: 
 Reduced scope for flexible procurement practices - by placing ‘some constraints on NZ’s ability to 
develop policies or apply practices which would be discriminatory in nature, the most obvious of 
which would be preferential buy local policies for procurement covered by our market access 
commitments’. However, ‘ability to support local suppliers in other ways than through preferential 
policy is not constrained by the WTOGPA,’ eg efforts by the MBIE to ‘develop the tendering 
capabilities of businesses so that they can be competitive both domestically and in foreign markets. 
These and other initiatives to support local businesses, such as through access to research grants or 
other incentives, are not precluded by WTOGPA accession’; 
 Precedent effect - as NZ’s WTOGPA offers a broader range of government entities than in its PTAs 
raises the possibility that negotiating partners in future PTAs may seek similar access. In general, it is 
in NZ’s interests to promote liberalization of government procurement markets in order to increase 
exports, but these will need to be weighed up against the demands of negotiating partners’; 
 Less negotiating coin for future PTAs - WTOGPA accession could ‘mean that there is less available 
access that NZ could offer in a future PTA with a WTOGPA party’; 
 Disputes - accession ‘could give rise to legal proceedings within NZ courts against a covered entity. As 
NZ already provides rights of redress to foreign tenderers through NZ courts, the risk of any increase 
in legal proceedings by an aggrieved supplier from a WTOGPA party is considered minimal.’ 
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including possibly other exporting activities, national welfare is likely to be reduced. Moreover, the 
main determinant of the size of a country’s traded sector is its exchange rate and associated, 
including macro, economic policies. With floating exchange rates any efforts to substantially raise 
exports would significantly appreciate the NZ$ to reduce the competitiveness of exports and import-
competing activities and make imports more competitive, thus working against achieving the export 
target (unless the increased exports are associated with a corresponding rise in imports and/or net 
capital outflow). Simply put, there is no sacrosanct policy ratio of exports/trade to GDP for any 
country - the appropriate size should depend on the underlying economic fundamentals, not on 
government fiat.
27
  
Given the inadequacy of the NIA it would have been better for the Government to have referred a 
study on WTOGPA accession to its Productivity Commission for an independent and transparent 
evaluation of the real economic costs and benefits. However, as in Australia it seems the 
Government’s main micro-economic reform advisor, which was modelled on the Australian version 
with statutory independence, is by Government choice being left out of such decisions and not being 
given an opportunity to conduct transparent public policy analysis in these trade areas.  
Also, like in Australia, the public examination of treaties, including trade agreements, suffers 
from weaknesses. Their parliamentary examination is left until the treaties have been negotiated, 
when details are made public for the first time. This is far too late to have any influence on the 
negotiations. This evaluation of what’s been negotiated is only done when the government has 
already decided to sign off on the treaty, thus tainting the parliamentary examination and any 
subsequent government or departmental assessment. It would be almost impossible for any such 
report to be overly critical of the agreed treaty negotiated, or to conclude that it is a bad agreement 
not in the country’s national economic interests. The NIA was not done until November 2014 after 
NZ’s offer was accepted, and not released publicly until January 2015.  
(c) Australian Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) and Other Arrangements 
Australia has embarked on an aggressive policy of negotiating PTAs since 2000, both bilaterally and 
plurilaterally. Some contain government procurement provisions. The general provisions of these 
agreements include conditional non-discrimination ie national treatment applying only to covered 
procurement, subject to many exclusions/exemptions, and extended only to the PTA Parties – so-
called ‘conditional’ MFN. Australia’s most recent PTA, with China, however, contained no specific 
government procurement provisions.  
Australia’s offers on covered procurement in PTAs have become very repetitive and stereotyped, 
and have done little to advance much needed reforms. Indeed, despite these provisions PTAs have 
been negotiated to facilitate development of murky measures in State and Commonwealth 
procurement to discriminate in favour of local content and industrial development, especially of 
SMEs. Australian procurement, especially by the States, has become more restrictive. Australia 
unfortunately has not used PTAs to reform its government procurement market, where most 
economic benefits would accrue.  
(i) Australian and New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA) 
ANZCERTA came into force in 1983. It called for ANZ to eliminate price preferences for domestic 
procurement, and to remove procurement offsets. It called for a single Tasman procurement market. 
ANZCERTA provided impetus for including NZ in the ANZ Government Procurement Agreement 
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 Export targets are sometimes advocated as a means of galvanising national effort to achieve a particular goal such as 
increasing growth. But experience shows the ever present danger that once set, if they are not achieved through 
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subsequently negotiated to achieve the Tasman procurement market, and to ensure national 
treatment. Those States with price preferences for domestic firms extended them to NZ suppliers by 
including their content as local content.  
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(ii) Singapore Australia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) 
Entering into force in July 2003, SAFTA’s government procurement provisions reflect some of the 
WTOGPA rules (Table A1). The key principle of non-discrimination (national treatment) applies to 
covered procurement, subject to exclusions. No minimum value thresholds apply to procurement by 
covered entities. Open and limited tendering is allowed. Procurement must achieve value for money.  
Substantial procurement excluded from covered procurement include procurement to promote 
industry development eg to assist SMEs, and for Australia to promote regional employment & 
training for indigenous people. Also excluded is procurement from own entities if no other supplier 
was invited to tender, unless the entity submitted a tender under open tendering; proprietary items to 
ensure integrity of machinery, equipment or systems or of a work, health or safety nature specified in 
industrial agreements, unless items are available from several sources and open tendering used; and 
for foreign aid. Moreover, the coverage of procurement entities is limited, especially for Australia.  
Other exclusions from covered procurement are purchases to protect essential security interests of 
arms, ammunition or war materials, or indispensable for national security or defence; necessary 
measures to protect public morals, order or safety, or human, animal or plant life or health; 
intellectual property; relating to handicapped persons, philanthropic institutions, or prison labour; and 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources. Rules-of-origin also restrict government purchases 
between the two markets, as the WTOGPA does not cover goods imported from each other that do 
not meet the origin requirements that are applied ‘in the normal course’ of trade between the 
Parties.
28
  
SAFTA has had minimal impact on Australia’s procurement system, especially at the central 
level. While it may have had some implications for the price preferences for domestic suppliers run 
by some States, it still left opportunities for these to be applied on non-covered procurement eg 
promoting SMEs and indigenous opportunities, and adopting murky non-price measures to encourage 
local content, including by the Commonwealth, with discrimination becoming hidden in procurement 
procedures and processes.  
(iii) Australia United States Free Trade Area (AUSFTA) 
AUSFTA became effective from 2005. Many procurement commitments cover procedures eg on the 
use of selective and limited tendering, timing and evaluation of tenders, and review provisions. In 
other areas, such as on specific measures and coverage of covered procurement, it contains pretty 
standard provisions in accordance with standard templates used to negotiate PTAs.
29
 It lists general 
principles applying to covered procurement eg conditional non-discrimination ie national treatment 
only on covered procurement between the Parties (ie conditional MFN). It covers entities at various 
government levels above minimum thresholds. There are many general and specific exceptions. As 
the coverage has been broadened so have the exclusions (Table A2).  
Generally excluded by both Parties are necessary measures to protect public morals, order or 
safety, or human, animal or plant life or health; intellectual property; relating to goods and services of 
handicapped persons, of philanthropic or not for profit institutions, or of prison labour (must not 
arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Parties under the same prevailing conditions, or act 
as a disguised trade restriction).  
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 There are essentially two templates. The NAFTA template followed, for example, by the US, and the GATS-based 
template followed mainly by developing countries.  
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Australia specifically excluded procurement benefiting SMEs; measures protecting national 
treasures of artistic, historic, or archaeological value, for indigenous health/welfare and for their 
economic and social advancement; plasma fractionation services and government advertising 
services; buy national requirements on articles, supplies, or materials used in construction. National 
treatment is not extended to Australian Industry Involvement programs and its successors; Australian 
Reward Investment Alliance of investment management, investment advisory, or master custody and 
safekeeping services for managing and investing the assets of Government superannuation funds. 
Buying motor vehicles by List A enterprises and telecom services by the War Memorial are also 
excluded. 
Also specifically excluded from covered procurement are certain types of procurement by covered 
State entities above the minimum thresholds. These cover health, welfare and education (ACT, NSW, 
QLD, SA, TAS); utility services (ACT); QLD, SA, TAS government advertising); motor vehicles 
(VIC, ACT, NSW, QLD, SA); NT set-asides for Charles Darwin University under Government 
Partnership Agreements; procurement by a covered entity for a non-covered entity (NSW, QLD, 
VIC).  
The US has also followed suit and made many similar exemptions at all government levels from 
covered procurement. 
Given the many exemptions, both general and specifically negotiated by both parties, the extent to 
which AUSFTA has liberalized respective markets in government procurement is largely illusory. 
Also, rules-of-origin mean that covered procurement excludes goods failing these requirements, so 
that they are a non-tariff measure on government procurement. 
AUSFTA has not significantly impacted on the core elements of Australia’s government 
procurement arrangements, except requiring procedural changes eg on non-open tendering. While 
having some implications for remaining State price preferences favouring domestic suppliers, they 
still had plenty of opportunities to apply them non-covered procurement eg promoting SMEs and 
adopting other less transparent non-price measures to encourage industry development and local 
content, including by the Commonwealth.  
(iv) Others 
AUSFTA’s government procurement provisions set the basis of Australia’s commitments in 
subsequent FTAs. These are the Australia-Chile Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA), effective March 
2009; the Japan Australia Economic Partnership Agreement (JAEPA), effective in January 2015; and 
the Korea Australia Free Trade Agreement (AKFTA), effective in December 2014.  
These agreements essentially repeat the principles for covered procurement negotiated in 
AUSFTA (Tables A3, A4 and A5, respectively), including on conditional non-discrimination 
(national treatment only on covered procurement and conditional MFN). However, like AUSFTA the 
comprehensive exemptions maintained by Parties to these PTAs, including on rules-of-origin, mean 
they have had minimal impact on reforming their procurement policies.  
In Australia, while they had some implications for the remaining State price preferences, they 
were left with plenty of scope to apply them on non-covered procurement eg promoting SMEs and to 
adopt other murky non-price measures to promote industry development, local content and 
indigenous businesses, including by the Commonwealth.  
(d) NZ Free Trade Agreements (Called Closer Economic Partnership)  
Several of these partnerships (PTAs) negotiated by New Zealand, both bilaterally and plurilaterally, 
contain provisions on government procurement.  
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(i) Agreement Between NZ and Singapore on a Closer Economic Partnership (NSCEP) 
NSCEP entered into force from 2001. It calls for establishing a single government procurement 
market to maximise competitive opportunities and reduce costs. Both parties committed to 
implementing the APEC Non-Binding Principles on Government Procurement on transparency, value 
for money, open and effective competition, fair dealing, accountability and due process, and 
conditional non-discrimination with national treatment subject to exceptions and applied only on 
covered procurement, and conditional MFN.30 Suppliers in principle are to compete equally and 
transparently, with no preferential schemes or other forms of discrimination by origin (Table A6). 
Value for money is the primary determinant, based on competition and non-discrimination, taking 
into account whole-of-life costs and benefits eg fitness for purpose, quality, performance and price.  
Included is covered procurement by mainly central agencies below 50,000 SDR. Also excluded is 
procurement funded primarily from special industry levies, community groups or special grants or 
public donations; generally inter-governmental activities; proprietary items to ensure machinery or 
equipment integrity; emergencies eg natural disasters, or urgent requirements of UN peacekeeping or 
humanitarian operations; of proprietary equipment of a work, health or safety nature specified in 
industrial agreements; defence procurement of a strategic nature and for national security; and under 
development assistance programmes. Rules-of-origin applied to covered procurement is also a non-
tariff measure. 
NSCEP had minimal impact on reforming NZ’s procurement system. It had already voluntarily 
adopted and applied the APEC Non-Binding Principles on a non-discriminatory basis to almost all 
procurement (the main exception being relatively minor local government procurement) for all trading 
partners under its unilateral reforms to open the economy to foreign competition. 
(ii) NZ Thailand Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (NTCEP) 
NTCEP entered into force from July 2005. It has very weak government procurement provisions, 
simply reaffirming a ‘desire’ to implement to the extent possible the APEC Non-Binding Principles on 
transparency, value for money, open and effective competition, fair dealing, accountability and due 
process, and non-discrimination as well as the APEC Transparency Standards for Government 
procurement on a ‘conditional’ MFN basis (Table A7). It established a working group to meet 
regularly to, inter alia, review these provisions. It was to report to the CEP Joint Commission within 
12 months of the Agreement’s entry into force with recommendations on the commencement of 
bilateral negotiations to expand these provisions. No such provisions on government procurement 
have been added, and NTCEP has had no impact on NZ’s government procurement arrangements. 
(iii) Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (P4) 
P4 came into force in 2006 with Brunei, Chile and Singapore. Government procurement provisions 
cover purchases by a positive list of government entities above thresholds of 50,000 SDR for goods 
and services and 5,000,000 SDR for construction, subject to substantial general and specific 
exemptions (Table A8). Its objective is to base procurement on the key principles of transparency, 
value for money, open and effective competition, fair dealing, accountability and due process, and 
conditional non-discrimination via a commitment to national treatment but only for non-excluded 
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covered procurement and between the P4 parties (‘conditional’ MFN).31 Rules-of-origin applied to 
covered procurement also acts as a non-tariff measure. 
The P4 made no changes to NZ’s procurement system.  
(iv) NZ-Hong Kong, China Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (NHKCEP) 
NHKCEP entered into force from 2011. It largely repeated NZ’s commitments in the P4, including 
exceptions along with conditional non-discrimination based on national treatment subject to 
exceptions and applying only to the parties (conditional MFN)(Table A9). It had no impact on NZ’s 
procurement system.  
5. Using Government Procurement as Industry Policy 
The WTO noted in its 2011 Trade Policy Review of Australia that (WTO, 2011): 
‘Australia has continued to use government procurement as an instrument of economic policy 
aimed at fostering industrial development in certain sensitive areas (e.g. real estate property or 
accommodation, R&D services, and motor vehicles) that are exempt from the mandatory 
procurement procedures applying to procurement above certain thresholds. The target of sourcing 
at least 10% of purchase value from small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), as well as 
preference margins for local suppliers and local-content requirements by certain state governments 
have been maintained and, in certain areas, reinforced but applied in line with FTA commitments.’  
That this situation has not changed, and probably worsened, is confirmed in the latest 2015 WTO 
Trade Policy Review (WTO, 2015), which states (WTO, 2015): 
Australia has continued to use government procurement as an instrument of economic policy 
aimed at fostering industrial development in certain sensitive areas that are exempt from 
mandatory rules applying to procurement above certain thresholds. Procurement rules were 
amended, inter alia, to redefine procurement methods and adjust to new legislation's terminology. 
The target of sourcing at least 10% of purchase value from small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), as well as preference margins for local suppliers and local-content requirements by 
certain state governments have been maintained and, in certain areas, revised. However they are 
applied in line with RTA commitments. Foreign participation in the bidding may require the 
submission of an Australian Industry Participation Plan. 
Despite government procurement commitments in PTAs Australia still uses Commonwealth and State 
procurement policies to meet industry policy and other localization objectives eg regional 
development, local content, especially for SMEs, and assisting the development and employment 
opportunities, including indigenous people. Thus, after reforming government procurement in the 
1980s to remove inter-state price preferences, reform stalled. Indeed, it has gone backwards by 
replacing more transparent price-preferences with murky and discretionary mechanisms promoting 
localization. These policies need reforming and PTAs are not contributing; indeed they are 
entrenching these negative developments by excluding such measures from commitments. 
Unfortunately, governments are assessing the economic value of PTAs by the ambiguous extent to 
which they open foreign markets instead of the degree to which they promote self-liberalization, 
where most of the gains to Australia are available.  
Unlike Australia, NZ procurement has seemingly in practice remained relatively open and non-
discriminatory on an ‘unconditional’ MFN basis, and not significantly used as an industry policy 
measure.  
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procurement commitments of Chile, Singapore and NZ. 
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a. Price Preferences 
The ANZGPA did not end price preferences for Australian content, despite the commitment for non-
discrimination and national treatment. Instead, the State price preferences were extended equally to 
NZ suppliers by including them in Australian content. This made Australia’s government procurement 
system more discriminatory against non-NZ suppliers. Thus, the ANZ single procurement market was 
achieved by adding greater discrimination against other countries, thereby raising the likelihood of 
diverting government purchases from more efficient non-Tasman suppliers, to Australia’s economic 
cost.  
Australian PTAs similarly have not resulted in Australian States removing their price preferences. 
The NSW’s response, for example, was to remove them for large enterprises and instead to focus 
preferences on SMEs, which with industry policies, are exempt from covered procurement. It 
subsequently removed these price preferences on SMEs, but not because they had to under PTA 
commitments. WA, the only state currently with price preferences, including for SMEs, removed their 
application for businesses located in the US or Chile for ‘covered procurements.’ Thus, the imported 
content impost is not applied to any portion of a bid that comprises goods or services imported from 
NZ, the US or Chile. Again, rather than removing price discrimination outright, Australia’s 
procurement regime in WA became more discriminatory against non-PTA parties. To the extent that 
these price preferences were used to assist SMEs (and possibly industry development) they would 
have been in any event excluded from Australia’s PTA commitments.  
National treatment obligations in PTAs only apply to covered procurement, thus leaving plenty of 
scope to apply such price preferences. Also, national treatment does not require their removal but 
rather that they be extended uniformly to PTA partners. Thus embedding national treatment into PTAs 
does not necessarily mean the end of price preferences.  
b. What Are Replacing Price Preferences?  
Australia, with the exception of WA, has removed price preferences favouring domestic suppliers. 
However, they are being replaced by murkier and more (economically) costly forms of discrimination, 
thereby going backwards. These non-transparent and discretionary measures may have a greater 
impact on prices and resource allocation than price preferences. This is similar to the substitution of 
tariffs with non-tariff measures that has accompanied reduced tariffs under the WTO.
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This highlights a general weakness of trade agreements. Governments will always fashion their 
commitments to provide leeway to assist domestic industries if the political economy at home 
necessitates providing selective industry assistance. The evidence supporting the argument that trade 
negotiations can successfully address this problem by mounting pressure from exporters benefiting via 
enhanced market access abroad to counter the demands by other sectors for import protection, has 
proved thin. Similarly, there is little evidence globally that trade agreements have positively reduced 
non-tariff measures ‘on the ground’ rather than simply ‘on paper’. Hence the crucial role of 
unilateralism in liberalizing trade, including of government procurement policies. 
All States and the Commonwealth now operate extensive buy local arrangements as integral parts 
to their procurement. They require tenderers to prepare various plans eg industry participation plans 
that must be submitted in the tender outlining proposed actions to provide Australian firms, especially 
SMEs, with supply opportunities. State and Commonwealth Government objectives, such as 
promoting regional development and local industries, including SMEs, are to be taken into account in 
determining value for money. In some states eg SA, WA and Tasmania, such plans for local content 
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use must be given significant minimum weightings in the tender evaluation, with wide discretion to 
raise them where considered appropriate. While it is claimed that these procurement arrangements are 
not designed to favour local industries over those from other states and abroad, and are still to meet 
value for money, the reality is more obscure and dubious.  
While value for money is still in principle the over-arching goal, it has become increasingly 
broadened to incorporate government local content and regional development objectives, especially 
promoting SMEs, which are often contradictory.
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 Increasingly, evaluating contracts is being 
interpreted in practice as value for money subject to meeting governments’ industrial development 
goals. Thus discrimination persists, now more discretionary and disguised.  
Published procurement figures show that almost all Commonwealth and State contracts are still let 
to local industries, including SEMs, using almost entirely local content. Moreover, this is increasing 
not falling. In State procurement, almost all contracts are supplied by ANZ firms, including own-state 
suppliers using own state-local content. For example, most (96%) of all SA procurement contracts let 
in 2012-13 were let to ANZ suppliers (98% by value); over two-thirds of total contracts were with SA 
suppliers (80% by value) and only 4% (2% by value) were let overseas. The share, by value, of 
contracts with SA suppliers rose from 42% in 2011-12 to 51% in 2012-13.  
While this may be partially explained by the natural advantages of dealing with easily accessible 
local suppliers and in many cases by their efficiency, the extremely high share of local participation 
and content is suspicious. It adds credence to the case that a significant contributing factor is the 
hidden and discretionary discrimination that still abounds, and is worsening, in Australian 
procurement policies. It would be in Australia’s national interest to reform such discrimination at all 
government levels. 
c. Effectiveness of Trade Agreements in Opening Government Procurement markets 
ANZ’s experience with trade agreements not opening their procurement markets to international 
competition is not unique. Considerable international evidence suggests this is also the case 
internationally. Empirically it seems that neither the WTOGPA nor PTAs have substantially reduced 
governments’ propensity to ‘buy national’, thus highlighting the difficulty of regulating non‐
transparent areas via international treaties (Rickard and Kono, 2011 and 2014). Another study based 
on Switzerland and Japan found that foreign access in services procurement has not risen since 
negotiation of the WTOGPA (Shingal, 2011). 
This is not surprising as trade agreements are usually negotiated intentionally to have minimal 
impact on self-measures, focusing instead on getting other parties to liberalize policies. In such 
circumstances it is little wonder that the impact of trade agreements on promoting self-liberalization is 
minimal, even though this is where the main economic gains would accrue. Trade agreements rarely 
lead domestic reforms; at best they can follow unilateral reforms and help lock them in, but even in 
this role they are imperfect. This seems to certainly be the case for Australian government 
procurement, and PTAs generally.  
Not only is the coverage of commitments inadequate, enforceability is also lacking. The loopholes 
and ambiguity in government procurement commitments under PTAs and the WTOGPA, together 
with the non-transparent and discretionary measures often utilized to protect government procurement 
which make them hard to detect and objectively qualify, undermines enforceability. Thus, it is not 
surprising that there have been few formal WTO disputes among WTOGPA parties; mounting these 
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 For example, SMEs are commonly likely to be at a cost disadvantage compared to large firms because they simply lack 
economies of scale and hence would be unable to come first on a simple ranking of value for money. Thus one way of 
discriminating in favour of SMEs would be for the procurement agency to let smaller individual contracts instead of 
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challenges is difficult and likely to fail. The same applies in PTAs. Moreover, informal discussions 
and consultations under the WTOGPA and PTAs, to the extent they occur is also likely to lead to 
minimal improvements.  
d. Motivation for Making Commitments on Government Procurement in Trade Agreements Flawed 
Economically 
Australia’s motivation for making government procurement commitments in trade agreements, 
including PTAs, is based on the flawed notion that obtaining greater access to overseas procurement 
markets is what trade policy is primarily about. However, evidence shows clearly that what of most 
economic gain to a country is opening its own policies to foreign competition. Australia should use its 
trade negotiations to do this, including on government procurement, if PTAs are going to be of 
significant benefit. Otherwise trade agreements will continue to be more about achieving non-
economic factors, and continue to be oversold by governments on the economic benefits.  
Since all parties approach trade negotiations, including on government procurement, from a 
mercantilist perspective, they inevitably under-perform in opening markets. Consequently broad and 
misleading statements and estimates of export benefits actually realized are advanced that do not 
reflect reality and the many exceptions to covered procurement included in PTAs. They rank poorly 
compared to unilateral reforms as part of a country’s domestic micro-economic agenda. Unilateralism 
must therefore remain the ‘main game in town’ in setting a country’s trade measures, which are 
ultimately domestic policy. The danger is that with greater focus on trade negotiations governments 
will lose sight of the far greater benefits that can arise from self-liberalization, and effectively make 
this conditional on obtaining overseas market access.  
Mercantilists, of which there are many among trade officials and politicians, would argue that 
Australia is benefiting substantially in its government procurement negotiations by getting better 
access to foreign procurement markets. They would argue that getting market access abroad without 
self-liberalizing in negotiations is a win/win situation. But mercantilists are never correct 
economically. They fail to appreciate that the main economic gains to Australia accrue from self-
reform, and assumes that trading partners with which it is negotiating PTAs are somehow less 
successful than Australia in negotiating to retain trade restrictions protecting their procurement 
market. The negotiations are based on the mistaken view that outcomes are a zero-sum game and 
hence trade negotiators must ‘outsmart’ each other to try and maximize benefits at the expense of 
trading partners.  
Unfortunately, Australia is assessing trade agreements not on the extent to which they promote 
unambiguous national-welfare enhancing self-liberalization where most gains arise, but on the extent 
to which they promote ambiguous marketing opening abroad, which is usually largely illusory and/or 
of uncertain economic benefit.  
e. The Main Restrictions to Government Procurement Often Lie Elsewhere 
Often the main restrictions on foreigners accessing a country’s government procurement markets in 
practice have little to do with government procurement arrangements. A major example is with 
services, which are increasingly being procured by governments.  
To tender for government projects foreign suppliers must first be able to trade their services with 
the country. For example, if foreign investment barriers restrict them from establishing commercial 
presence (mode 3 under the GATS) then they will be unable to access the government procurement 
market. Similarly, restrictions on foreign suppliers exporting services cross-border (mode 1) or by 
temporarily moving persons (mode 4) can also hinder their capacity to competitively supply services. 
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Thus, while ever these restrictions to trade in services exist no amount of government procurement 
reform will open the market to foreign suppliers.
34
 Liberalising trade in services, especially mode 3, in 
these cases should be the main priority. Again evidence shows that trade agreements, including PTAs, 
achieve little actual services liberalization, and that unilateral reforms offer the best way forward. 
PTAs also introduce non-tariff measures on government procurement trade via rules-of-origin. 
Goods not meeting the PTA rules-of-origin set on trade between parties are not covered by 
commitments on government procurement.  
f. Will NZ’s Accession to and Australia’s Probable Membership of the WTOGPA Help? 
In terms of promoting self-liberalization of government procurement policies the answer is highly 
unlikely. As accession will become no more than a means of exchanging concessions with minimal 
impact on actual government procurement practices of the parties, realized economic gains to ANZ are 
likely to be minimal, despite government claims of large benefits via increased exports from opening 
overseas procurement markets.  
For example, Australian DFAT indicates joining the WTOGPA would provide meaningful and 
legally binding market access abroad, especially to China on its accession, even though it also states 
that Australian firms are not automatically disqualified from participation in WTOGPA Member 
markets. While such market access benefits are tantalizing to governments, and industry, in reality 
such export gains from trade agreements are often illusory at worst, and at best highly overstated. In 
the case of AUSFTA, for instance, DFAT claimed at the time that it gave Australian suppliers access 
to the US federal procurement market, worth at least US$535 billion annually, and would open 31 
state governments to Australia. However, such access was seriously constrained by many exceptions 
negotiated by the US (as did Australia). The AUSFTA study commissioned by DFAT to highlight 
AUSFTA’s economic gains to Australia assumed unrealistically that its suppliers would achieve 30% 
as much penetration in the US market as Canadian businesses, thereby providing export benefits to 
Australia of $200 million annually. However, a more realistic estimate would have been to reduce 
these benefits to about one-eighth, or about $25 million annually (Dee, 2004). It is unsure even if these 
more modest amounts have been realized. 
Thus, Australia will achieve little in way of economic benefits from joining the WTOGPA unless it 
uses these negotiations to reform its worsening government procurement arrangements, where most 
gains lie. Since it has not done this in its PTAs, largely because it is virtually impossible given the 
mercantilism approach inherent in trade negotiations, there is no reason to believe it will happen in 
any WTOGPA negotiations. Australia will almost certainly base its negotiated WTOGPA offers on its 
PTA commitments, most notably AUSFTA. Thus, the same coverage weaknesses and significant 
exclusions will continue allowing non-transparent and discretionary Australian government 
procurement practices to discriminate in favour of industrial development and local content.  
Indeed, if joining the WTOGPA, like signing PTAs in general, were subject to a proper benefit cost 
analysis they would probably fail, at least on economic gains. Many of the advertised benefits such as 
market access abroad would be heavily discounted, and other claimed gains such as helping Australia 
adopt liberalizing measures on an unconditional MFN basis because by their nature they cannot be 
applied discriminatorily, would be ignored completely, while many of the costs would be magnified, 
such as failure to enhance self-liberalization.  
At least NZ’s government procurement policies seem relatively open in comparison, so that locking 
in its unilateral openness may have some benefits. However, to the extent that it used the negotiations 
                                                     
34
 While the GATS recognizes this link, its commitments on MFN, national treatment and market access do not apply to 
government procurement of services (GATS’ Article XIII). Multilateral negotiations on government procurement in 
services under the GATS were to be held by 1997 but these have not occurred.  
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to maintain some discriminatory practices, joining the WTOGPA represents a lost opportunity for 
further reform.  
g. Proliferation of ‘Red Tape’  
Many of the disciplines included in PTAs and WTOGPA commitments on government procurement 
cover methods and procedures to be followed during the tendering cycle. These cover, for example, 
publication of tender information, minimum time limits when issuing tenders, rules governing the 
form of tender, and publication of tender awards. While stipulating such procedures and processes and 
applying some minimum standards may be useful, applying them is not costless. They add significant 
‘red tape’ that can make the tendering cycle more cumbersome and costly for governments and 
bidders. Thus a balance is needed, with the worst of all outcomes possibly occurring. Trade 
agreements are imposing such costs without much opening of procurement markets to foreign 
competition.  
The complexity and cumbersomeness of Australian procurement systems have also increased, 
especially at the State level, largely coinciding with the shift from relatively straightforward means of 
discriminating locally, such as price preferences, with hidden discretionary measures involving local 
content plans and weightings to be applied in awarding contracts to still attain in principle best value 
for money but also having to take of account other often contradictory objectives, like promoting 
regional industry development, especially for SMEs. Such arrangements compound ‘red tape’ and 
make tendering more costly for suppliers and procurement entities.  
6. Conclusions 
ANZ trade agreements have by-and-large had minimal impact on government procurement policies. 
Reforms in both countries substantially pre-date their PTAs. These reforms can be traced back to the 
mid-1980s when, for example, Australia unilaterally removed inter-state price preferences, including 
NZ, to form a single procurement market, and a few States and the Commonwealth removed them 
against imported content. 
Those States that maintained price preferences extended them to NZ content. Thus, the single 
Tasman market was achieved by Australia extending discriminatory practices to protect NZ content, at 
the expense of non-ANZ suppliers. NZ, having seemingly no significant price preferences or other 
discriminatory practices continued to practice national treatment with minimal exceptions on an 
unconditional MFN basis. NZ took substantial steps unilaterally to reform its government procurement 
market without using trade agreements and conditional MFN.  
These reforms were reflected in the APEC Non-binding Principles on Government Procurement in 
which ANZ participated. By the late 1990s they had adopted government procurement arrangements, 
at least at the central level, considered consistent with these principles. Price preferences operated by 
some States, however, remained inconsistent, but permitted owing to APEC’s non-binding nature.  
While NZ has continued to unilaterally maintain this relatively open government procurement 
market the opposite is the case for Australia. Its procurement system still has major areas needing 
reform, both at the Commonwealth and State level. One state, WA, still retains price preferences, 
although not in regard to covered procurements with trading partners under PTAs. States have ensured 
their procurement arrangements are consistent with PTA commitments, but in a way that has not 
reformed procurement policies.  
Indeed, Australia’s procurement system has gone backwards, especially at the State level. While 
price preferences have largely been eliminated (not because of PTAs) they have been replaced with 
murky less transparent discretionary measures designed to promote industry development and local 
content, especially involving SMEs. Such open-ended discriminatory measures are difficult to 
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evaluate and are highly likely to be more distortionary and economically inefficient than price-
preferences that are transparent, work directly through the price system and caps the assistance 
potentially provided to domestic suppliers. Accompanying these changes has been also increased 
complexity and ‘red tape’ in government procurement arrangements, especially at the state level, 
which has made contracting more costly for tenderers and procuring entities.,  
Australia’s PTAs have not prevented these backward developments. Instead, they have entrenched 
them by negotiating commitments based on ‘conditional liberalization’ whereby the national treatment 
obligation only applies to covered procurement, which excludes Australia’s use of government 
procurement policies to promote industry development and local content, especially by SMEs and 
indigenous businesses.  
Australia has unfortunately negotiated its PTAs to minimize their impact on government 
procurement policies, both centrally and at the state level. PTAs, including in NZ, are being 
incorrectly assessed using a mercantilist approach highlighting the (ambiguous) economic benefits of 
increased exports due to opening foreign markets rather than the extent to which they promote self-
liberalization, where most of the gains to Australia would flow. Reforming its government 
procurement policies, irrespective of what other countries do, would yield most economic benefits to 
Australia, and hence should be priority. However, as evidence repeatedly shows PTAs achieve little 
actual liberalization of non-tariff measures in practice, especially when the fine print is read and other 
restrictions are taken into account. This is because PTAs are negotiated on the basis that offering self-
liberalization is a ‘cost or concession’ to receive the benefits of increased market access abroad.  
Thus, Australia’s PTAs have played a minimal role in promoting much needed reform to 
government procurement. It still uses these policies to achieve industry policy and local content 
objectives, both at the State and Commonwealth levels, undermining national welfare. Reforming 
these policies requires unilateral reforms – PTAs will not achieve this.  
ANZ’s PTA offers are repetitive, which for Australia regurgitates wide-ranging general and 
specific exemptions to benefit SMEs and promote local content generally to allow its murky 
discretionary discriminatory policies.  
ANZ had not joined the WTOGPA because they considered it a bad agreement due to conditional 
MFN, major exclusions from covered procurement and overly-prescriptive approaches to government 
procurement. However, while the WTOGPA still suffers from these weaknesses (as do ANZ PTA 
commitments) NZ has just acceded to it with offers closely resembling those in its PTAs. NZ’s 
WTOGPA commitments have primarily locked in its unilateral and unconditional MFN openness, 
although there are still exceptions to national treatment that may accommodate some discretionary 
policies, especially by local government. If this covers substantial exemptions in practice, than 
WTOGPA membership, as with its PTAs, represent lost opportunities for NZ to further reform its 
government procurement system. Australia announced in November 2014 that it would most likely 
follow suit.  
Australia’s announced in November 2014 that it would most likely try and accede to the 
WTOGPA. Such membership is highly likely to follow its approach in PTAs to exclude from 
commitments discretionary discriminatory procurement measures and to entrench policies favouring 
industrial development and local content, especially for SMEs and the indigenous population. 
Commitments will almost certainly repeat PTA offers, especially AUSFTA, thus promoting no 
domestic reform in areas that matter, while increasing ‘red tape’. Australia seems set on erroneously 
assessing accession based on achieving (dubious) export gains from greater market access to foreign 
procurement markets rather than on whether it advances self-liberalization of procurement policies, 
where most gains unambiguously lie.  
The failure of trade agreements to open ANZ procurement markets is reflected internationally. 
Studies have shown that government procurement commitments in PTAs and the WTPGPA have not 
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opened procurement markets. Hence inflated assessments of the extent to which trade agreements will 
create exports to foreign procurement markets must largely discounted to maintain reality.  
Given the politicization of PTAs in ANZ and the governments’ fetish to negotiate them, which 
reflect international developments, a serious policy shortcoming in domestic processes is their severe 
lack of transparency of such negotiations. ANZ experience in negotiating trade agreements highlights 
the secrecy with which governments and trade ministries conduct the negotiations. Trade ministries 
holding consultations with interested stakeholders, especially the private sector, achieve little and 
inadequately address these transparency concerns. By the time the negotiated agreement and its 
contents, including the country’s offers, is released for public scrutiny and assessment, also by 
parliament, the government has ‘signed off’ on it. There are no sensible reasons why such details, 
including the government’s offers, cannot be released publicly during the negotiations to enable public 
scrutiny. Such transparency would produce better decision outcomes on national welfare and make 
governments and trade ministries more accountable for their negotiations. After all trade policy is 
domestic economic policy. Their secrecy primarily reflects flawed mercantilism that it will produce 
better results. This is untrue and in reality secrecy is kept to allow trade ministries and governments to 
keep control over the negotiations by avoiding public scrutiny. 
As trade ministries have vested interests in negotiating trade agreements, experience shows that 
they cannot be relied upon to professionally assess their economic assessments on the national welfare 
implications. Efforts in ANZ, as elsewhere, have highlighted that so-called independent studies 
commissioned by trade ministries on the gains from trade agreements are flawed and biased towards 
government views. Once the decision to conduct such a study is made these are always supportive of 
the agreement. The public NIA prepared by NZ on WTOGPA accession was highly inadequate, as 
was the study commissioned by DFAT to assess the gains to Australia of AUSFTA, including the 
export benefits to Australia on the perceived government procurement access to the US.  
It is therefore disappointing that ANZ governments have not let their primary trade and other 
micro-economic advisors, the Productivity Commission, to play any role in assessing the national 
welfare effects of trade agreements, especially PTAs, on their economies. Without this constraint, the 
ANZ governments are given free rein to exaggerate and oversell the economic benefits of trade 
agreements, including on government procurement. Hopefully Australia will enable the Productivity 
Commission to conduct an independent study on its WTOGPA accession.  
If, as appears probable, governments are going to persist in pursuing PTAs, it is vital that these 
discriminatory arrangements do not come at the expense of the WTO and more importantly unilateral 
trade reforms, both of which are based on the key principle of non-discrimination (unconditional 
MFN). However, experience suggests achieving this is easier said than done. PTAs tend to displace 
these other superior approaches to reform, as the government procurement example in ANZ 
highlights.  
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Appendix Tables 
Table A1: Summary of Key Government Procurement Provisions of SAFTA  
Feature Description 
Coverage Law, regulation, procedure or practice regarding procurement by covered entities, & by 
contractual means eg purchase, lease, rental, hire purchase. Entities covered via positive list.  
General Principles NT for goods, services, & suppliers, including local foreign-owned/affiliated firms. Cannot 
discriminate against local firms based on the goods & services supplied from the other Party. No 
discrimination in favour of corporate bodies with government shareholding. Parties to follow 
competitive neutrality using reasonable measures to ensure that governments at all levels provide 
no competitive advantage to businesses based on government ownership. 
General Exclusions Goods & services from own entities if no other supplier invited to tender, unless the entity 
tendered under open tendering; proprietary items ensuring integrity of machinery, equipment or 
systems or of a work, health or safety nature specified in industrial agreements, unless available 
from several sources & open tendering used; foreign aid; overseas to consume abroad; asset 
management & financial advisory services pertaining to government reserves; & to promote 
industry development eg to assist SMEs. 
General Exceptions Action or not disclosing information necessary to protect essential security interests in procuring 
arms, ammunition or war materials, or indispensable for national security or defence. Necessary 
measures to protect public morals, order or safety, or human, animal or plant life or health; 
intellectual property; of handicapped persons, of philanthropic institutions, or of prison labour; 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources;  
Tendering processes Open or limited tendering allowed.  
Awarding contracts Ensure tendering procedures provide mechanisms to eliminate conflicts of interest; achieve value 
for money; conducted fairly & non-discriminatorily.  
Rules-of-origin Those applied in the normal course of trade between the parties. 
Thresholds None 
Australia  
General exclusions Promoting employment & training for indigenous people in such regions (not to arbitrarily or 
unjustifiably discriminate between Parties or be a disguised trade restriction). 
Central entities  A number of Commonwealth Departments, including Defence, and Financial Management & 
Accountability Act Agencies.  
Singapore  
Entities A number of ministries, departments, Organs of State, & statutory boards. 
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Table A2: Summary of Key Government Procurement Provisions of AUSFTA  
Feature Description 
Coverage  Goods & services (including construction
35
, unless excluded) by contractual means (eg purchase, rental or 
lease), build-operate-transfer & public works concession contracts, exceeding the relevant threshold 
values by an entity not excluded from coverage. Defence procurement is covered by the 1995 
memorandum between the two Governments on reciprocal defence procurement.  
General 
Principles 
NT for goods, services & suppliers, including local foreign-owned/affiliated firms. Cannot discriminate 
against local firms based on the goods & services supplied from the other Party. 
Prohibited Offsets.
36
 
General 
Exclusions 
Procurement funded by any assistance eg grants, loans, equity infusions, fiscal incentives, subsidies; from 
own entities & by or between procuring entities; foreign aid; research & development; overseas to 
consume abroad; by fiscal agency or depository services, liquidation & management services for regulated 
financial institutions, & sale/distribution services for government debt.  
General 
Exceptions 
 Necessary measures to protect public morals, order or safety, or human, animal or plant life or health; 
intellectual property; of handicapped persons, philanthropic or not for profit institutions, or of prison 
labour (must not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Parties or act as a disguised trade 
restriction).  
Rules-of-
origin 
 Those applied in the normal course of trade between the Parties. 
Country 
Exceptions 
  
Australia   
National Preferences benefiting SMEs; measures protecting national artistic, historic, or archaeological treasures; 
indigenous health/welfare & their economic/social advancement; plasma fractionation services; 
government advertising services; buy national requirements on construction articles, supplies or materials. 
NT not extended to Industry Involvement Program & successors. 
Central 
entities  
Procurement by/of many specified defence-related & other goods by defence department & Defence 
Material Organization seen essential for security, covering design, development, integration, test, 
evaluation, maintenance, repair, modification, rebuilding & installation of military systems & equipment; 
Government-owned defence facilities; space services; services supporting military forces overseas; 
Defence Intelligence Organisation, Defence Signals Directorate, & Defence Imagery and Geospatial 
Organisation. 
Central 
entities 
(other)  
Australian Reward Investment Alliance of investment management, investment advisory or master custody 
& safekeeping services for managing & investing assets of Government superannuation funds. Motor 
vehicles by List A government enterprises & telecom services by the War Memorial.  
 States Procurement of health, welfare & education (ACT, NSW, QLD, SA, TAS); utility services (ACT); government 
advertising (QLD, SA, TAS); motor vehicles (VIC, ACT, NSW, QLD, SA); set-asides for Charles Darwin 
University under Government Partnership Agreements (NT); by a covered entity for a non-covered entity 
(NSW, QLD & VIC). 
United 
States 
 
National Procurement by/of set asides for small or minority businesses (eg any form of preference like exclusive 
rights to provide goods & services, & price preferences); transportation services as part of, or incidental to, 
a procurement contract; covered entity on behalf of non-covered entities at a different level of 
government; specified basic telecommunications network & services eg public voice & data services; 
maintenance, repair, modification, rebuilding & installation of goods/equipment as well as of equipment 
for ships; non-nuclear ship repair; government-owned facilities; facilities of the energy department & the 
National Aeronautics & Space Administration; research & development facilities; utilities; transportation, 
travel & relocation services: services supporting military forces overseas; dredging services; buy national 
requirements on construction articles, supplies or materials. 
Central Procurement by/of defence department of many specified defence-related & other equipment eg buses, 
                                                     
35
 Australia requires tenderers for construction to meet the National Code of Practice for the Construction Industry and 
related implementation guidelines of central & regional governments.  
36
 Australia to phase-out NSW & QLD non-compliant offset & preference schemes, along with non-compliant parts of the 
NT’s Building Northern Territory Industry Participation program, within 3 years from the date of the Agreement’s entry 
into force. Any QLD measure providing for inclusion of offsets in procurements & non-compliant parts of VIC Industry 
Participation Policy also to be phased out over the same period. 
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entities  hand & measuring tools, textiles/clothing/footwear, war materials, ammunition, & other goods & services 
essential for security; & defence department facilities. 
Central 
entities 
(other) 
Procurement by/of energy & national security departments to safeguard nuclear materials or technology 
(Atomic Energy Act), or oil bought for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve; agriculture department of goods 
for agricultural support or human feeding programs; shipbuilding of the National Oceanic & Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA); by the Transportation Security Administration, Coast Guard; Federal Aviation 
Administration; General Services Administration of hand tools, measuring tools, cutlery & flatware; Rural 
Utilities Service (sole List B government enterprise for federal buy national requirements set as funding 
conditions for all power generation projects); & excludes all other aspects of its procurement eg 
restrictions on financing for telecommunications. Restrictions attached to Federal funds for airport 
projects by List A & List B government enterprises exempt.
 
 
State 
entities 
Procurement by/of Office of Fish & Game, & construction (Arkansas); beef, compost or mulch (Georgia); 
software & construction (Hawaii); construction, automobiles or aircraft (Kansas); construction (Kentucky); 
services (Mississippi & Tennessee); public authorities & public benefit corporations with multi-state 
mandates, transit cars, buses, or related equipment (New York); construction (Oklahoma); boats, 
automobiles, buses, or related equipment (Rhode Island); beef (South Dakota); preferences for motor 
vehicles, travel agents, & rubberized asphalt paving made from scrap tyres by a state facility (Texas); & 
fuel, paper products, boats, ships & vessels (Washington); & for those many entities identified with pre-
existing restrictions, construction-grade steel, motor vehicles & coal. Preferences or restrictions in 
programs promoting development of distressed areas or businesses owned by minorities, disabled 
veterans, or women; restrictions to promote states’ environmental quality (provided not a disguised trade 
barrier); restrictions attached to Federal funds for mass transit and highway projects; & printing.
 
 
Tendering 
Procedures 
Open tendering. Selective tendering allowed provided invited as many domestic & other party suppliers 
consistent with efficient procurement, & used either an appropriate multi-use list of suppliers, or a list of 
suppliers responding to an invitational notice to apply, or a list of suppliers responding to a notice 
requesting expressions of interest provided notice published & contains information required & invites all 
interested suppliers (unless the notice stipulates the number invited may be limited); or a list of all 
licensed suppliers, or one determined by the appropriate body to comply with specific legal requirements 
independent of the procurement process, provided that (a) licensing requirements or need to comply with 
specific legalities is essential (b) appropriate body maintains the full list of such suppliers & it is accessible 
& (c) all listed suppliers are invited to tender.  
Limited tendering allowed (provided not used to avoid competition, protect domestic suppliers, or 
discriminate against other Party suppliers) if no responses received to a prior notice, invitation to 
participate or tender or conformed to the essential requirements, or no supplier met the conditions; items 
only available from a certain supplier & no reasonable alternative or substitute exists due to (a) covers 
works of art (b) protect patents, copyrights, or other exclusive rights, or proprietary information (c) 
competition is absent for technical reasons; for additional deliveries by the original supplier to replace 
parts, extend, or continue services for existing equipment, software, services, or installations, where 
changing suppliers would compel buying item not interchangeable with existing equipment; commodities; 
a prototype or an item for limited trial or developed at its request in the course of, and for, a particular 
research, experiment, study, or original development; as strictly necessary to meet emergencies from 
unforeseen events; new construction services of repeated similar services initially awarded by open 
tender, or by selective tender complying with these provisions if the initial procurement notice stated 
limited tendering may be used; purchases in exceptionally advantageous short-term cases eg unusual 
disposal, unsolicited innovative proposals, liquidation, bankruptcy, or receivership; or for contracts 
awarded winners of a design contest consistent with these provisions & judged independently. 
Multiple 
thresholds  
(a) central entities – G&S = A$80,000 or US$79,507; construction = A$7.767,000 or US$7,864,000 (b) 
regional government entities – G&S = A$551,000 or US$558,000; construction = A$7,767,000 or 
US$7,864,000 (c) government enterprises – G&S = A$402,000 or US$397,535 for List A agencies & 
US$629,000
37
 for List B agencies; construction = A$7,767,000 or US$ 7,864,000.
38
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 Australia listed no List B agencies. 
38
 Thresholds adjusted biennially, starting 1 January 2006.  
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Table A3: Summary of Key Government Procurement Provisions of ACFTA 
Feature Description 
Coverage  goods/services (including construction
39
) by any contractual means (eg purchase, rental or lease, 
build-operate-transfer contracts and public works concessions contracts) equal to or above specified 
value thresholds conducted by specified procuring entity, and subject to the conditions specified in 
Annex 15-A. 
Positive list of central & sub-central entities. 
General principles Goods, services and suppliers to receive NT, including for locally established foreign-owned or 
affiliated suppliers, irrespective of degree of foreign affiliation or ownership. Cannot discriminate 
against a locally established supplier on the basis that the goods or services it supplies for a particular 
procurement are from the other Party.  
Prohibited  Offsets 
General exclusions (a) under non-contractual agreements or any form of assistance eg grants, loans, equity infusions, 
fiscal incentives, subsidies, guarantees, cooperative agreements and sponsorship arrangements (b) 
by direct foreign aid (c) funded by international grants, loans or other assistance (d) public 
employment contracts (e) financial service (f) of goods & services procured from another entity or 
with a regional or local government, where no other supplier has been asked to tender (g) overseas 
procured goods & services for consumption abroad (h) funded by grants &/or sponsorship payments 
received from a person other than a procuring entity (i)by fiscal agency or depository services, 
liquidation & management services for regulated financial institutions, or services related to the sale, 
redemption and distribution of public debt, including loans and government bonds, notes, derivatives 
& other securities (j) rental of land, existing buildings or other immovable property or rights thereon 
where not part of procurement of construction. 
General 
exceptions 
If not applied to arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate or a disguised trade restriction measures 
necessary to protect (a) public morals, order or safety (b) human, animal, or plant life or health
40
 (c) 
intellectual property (d) or relating to goods & services of handicapped persons, of philanthropic or 
not for profit institutions, or of prison labour. Actions considered necessary to protect essential 
security indispensable to national security or defence.  
Multiple thresholds (a) central entities - goods & services of A$87,000 or CLP$35,911,000, construction of A$9,570,000 or 
CLP$3,940,806,000 (b) non-central entities - goods & services of A$679,000 or CLP$279,557,000, 
construction of A$9,570,000 or CLP$3,940,806,000 (c) other - goods & services of A$436,000 or 
CLP$ 179,558,000
41
, construction of A$9,570,000 or CLP$ 3,940,806,000.
42
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 Chile has excluded construction services intended for Easter Island. Australia requires as a condition to receiving NT & 
participating in procurement of building and construction services compliance with the National Code of Practice for the 
Construction Industry & related implementation guidelines of central & sub-central governments, & their successor 
policies & guidelines. Buy national requirements on articles, supplies or materials acquired for use in construction 
services contracts covered by this Chapter shall not apply to goods of either Party. 
40
 Covers environmental measures.  
41
 Australia has excluded procurement of motor vehicles for these specified entities. 
42
 Thresholds to be adjusted biannually, starting 1 January 2010, to align with the adjusted thresholds for equivalent 
procurement categories listed in respective FTA with the US.  
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Tendering 
procedures 
Only open or selective tendering. To ensure effective competition under selective tendering, largest 
number of domestic & tenderers from the other Party to be invited consistent with the procurement 
system’s efficient operation, & selected in a ‘fair and non-discriminatory’ manner. Limited tendering 
only allowed (provided not aimed at avoiding competition, protecting domestic suppliers or to 
discriminate against suppliers of the other Party) if (a) in response to a prior notice, invitation to 
participate, or invitation to tender (i) no tenders were submitted (or that conformed to the essential 
documentary requirements) or no suppliers requested participation (ii) no suppliers satisfied 
participatory conditions (b) where, for works of art, or to protect exclusive rights eg patents, 
copyrights, proprietary information, or where competition is absent for technical reasons, 
goods/services can only come from a certain supplier & no reasonable alternative or substitute exists 
(c) for additional deliveries by the original supplier (or authorised agent) to replace parts, extensions, 
or continuing services for existing equipment, software, services or installations, where changing 
supplier would compel procurement of goods/services not compatible with existing equipment, 
software, services, or installations (d) for goods purchased on a commodity market (e) to procure a 
prototype or a first good/service intended for limited trial as part of a particular contract for 
research, experiment, study, or original development (f) extra construction services not in the initial 
contract but come within the objectives of the original tender documentation have under unforeseen 
circumstances become necessary to complete the construction services (limited to 50% of the total 
value of the initial contract (g) for new construction services repeating similar services that conform 
to a basic project of an initial contract awarded using of open or selective tendering, & where the 
subsequent use of limited tendering for such services has been stated in the notice of intended 
procurement concerning the initial construction (h) for purchases under exceptionally short-term 
advantageous conditions eg from unusual disposals, unsolicited innovative proposals, liquidation, 
bankruptcy or receivership & not for routine purchases from regular suppliers (i) where a contract is 
awarded to the winner of a design contest provided (i) the contest has been organised consistently 
with the Agreement & (ii) judged by an independent jury (j) where essential due to extreme urgency 
from unforeseen events unforeseen by the procuring entity the goods/services could not be timely 
procured by open or selective tendering. 
Australia  
National  Any preference benefiting SMEs, and measures to (a) protect national treasures of artistic, historic, or 
archaeological value (b) for the health & welfare of indigenous people or for their economic and 
social advancement. NT exception applied to the Australian Industry Involvement Program & its 
successors. Specifically excluded is procurement by Department of Defence & DMO, Defence 
Intelligence Organisation, the Defence Signals Directorate or the Defence Imagery & Geospatial 
Organisation, as well as design and all activities associated with military systems and equipment; 
operation of Government-owned facilities, space services, & services supporting military forces 
overseas; the Australian Reward Investment Alliance of investment management, investment; 
advisory or master custody and safekeeping services for managing and investing the assets of 
Australian Government superannuation funds; health & welfare services
43
; & of telecom services by 
the Australian War Memorial; research & development services, plasma fractionation services or 
government advertising services. 
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 ACT, NSW, SA, VIC have excluded the procurement of health & welfare services, education services, utility services or 
motor vehicles; NSW, QLD have excluded procurement by a covered entity on behalf of a non-covered entity; NT has 
excluded set-asides on behalf of the Charles Darwin University pursuant to Partnership Agreements between the NT 
Government and Charles Darwin University; QLD, SA have also excluded procurement of government advertising; TAS 
has excluded the procurement of health & welfare services, education services or advertising services. VIC has excluded 
procurement of motor vehicles 
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Table A4: Summary of Key Government Procurement Provisions in JAEPA 
Feature Description 
Coverage  Goods/services (including construction, unless noted otherwise) by any contractual means 
(including purchase, rental, or lease), build-operate-transfer contracts, & public works concessions 
contracts equal to or exceeding the relevant threshold values by a covered entity not excluded 
from coverage. 
General Principles G&S, & suppliers receive NT, including for locally established foreign-owned or affiliated suppliers 
irrespective of degree of foreign affiliation or ownership. Cannot discriminate against locally 
established suppliers on the basis the goods/services supplied are from the other Party. 
Prohibited Cannot seek, take account of, impose or enforce any offset ie any condition or undertaking that 
encourages local development or improves a Party’s balance-of-payments accounts eg use of 
domestic content, technology licensing, investment, counter-trade. 
General Exclusions Non-contractual agreements or any form of assistance eg grants, loans, equity infusions, fiscal 
incentives, subsidies; goods/services from own entities & by or between procuring entities; directly 
for foreign aid; research & development; overseas (including construction) to consume abroad; 
public employment contracts; acquisition or rental of land, existing buildings, or other immovable 
property or rights thereon; under an international agreement for stationing troops or relating to 
the joint implementation of a project; fiscal agency or depository services, liquidation & 
management services for regulated financial institutions, or services related to the sale, 
redemption & distribution of public debt, including loans & government bonds, notes, derivatives & 
other securities; under the particular procedure or condition of an international organisation, or 
funded by international grants, loans, or other assistance where the applicable procedure or 
condition would be inconsistent with these provisions. 
General Exceptions  Action considered necessary to protect essential security interests indispensable for national 
security or for national defence purposes. Necessary measures to protect public morals, order or 
safety, or human, animal or plant life or health
44
; intellectual property; relating to G&S of 
handicapped persons, of philanthropic or not for profit institutions, or of prison labour (must not 
arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Parties under the same prevailing conditions, or act 
as a disguised trade restriction. 
Country Exceptions   
Australia  
National NT & non-discrimination not extended to the Australian industry capability program and its 
successor programs and policies. Blood &related products, including plasma derived products & 
plasma fractionation services; government advertising services; health & welfare services; legal 
services; telecommunications; education services; financial services; & transport services. Excludes 
any form of preference benefiting SMEs; measures protecting national treasures of artistic, historic, 
or archaeological value; measures for the health/welfare of Indigenous people, & their economic & 
social advancement; & 
financial advisory & asset management services pertaining to reserves held, including for the 
purposes of funding retirement benefits. Suppliers of construction services must comply with the 
National Code of Practice for the Construction Industry & related implementation guidelines at all 
government levels. 
Central entity 
(mainly defence-
related) 
Many specified defence-related & other goods by Department of Defence & Defence Material 
Organization judged essential for security; covering the design, development, integration, test, 
evaluation, maintenance, repair, modification, rebuilding & installation of military systems & 
equipment; operation of Government-owned defence facilities; space services; services supporting 
military forces overseas; G&S procured by, or on behalf of, the Defence Intelligence Organisation, 
the Defence Signals Directorate, the Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation. 
Central entities 
(other)  
Motor vehicles (including by ‘other’ entities) & telecomm services by the Australian War Memorial. 
States Health & welfare services (ACT); education services & motor vehicles (NSW); by a covered entity on 
behalf of a non-covered entity (NSW, QLD, VIC); set-asides on behalf of the Charles Darwin 
University pursuant to Partnership Agreement with state government (NT); by departments, or 
parts of departments, which deliver health, education, training and/or arts (QLD); health services, 
education services, training services, arts services, welfare services, government advertising & 
motor vehicles (QLD); health & welfare services, education services, advertising services, or motor 
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vehicles (SA); health & welfare services, education services, or advertising services (TAS); & motor 
vehicles (VIC). 
Japan  
National Contracts awarded to co-operatives or associations under laws & regulations existing when the FTA 
entered into force. A positive list of specified services covered, including of telecomm services, 
thereby excluding many services. 
Central entities 
(mainly defence-
related) 
A positive list of goods covered by the Ministry of Defence, thus excluding most defence-related 
products. 
Central entities 
(other) 
Na 
‘Other’ entities Contracts awarded by Group A entities for purposes of their daily profit-making activities exposed 
to competitive markets (cannot be used to circumvent GP provisions). Procurement related to 
operational safety of transportation; could disclose information incompatible with the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or with international agreements on intellectual 
property rights; for safety-related activities aimed at utilising & managing radioactive materials & 
responding to emergencies of nuclear installation; related to geological & geophysical survey; 
advertising services, construction & real estate services; & ships jointly privately owned. 
State entities G&S related to operational safety of transportation; electricity production, transport or 
distribution; contracts awarded for purposes of their daily profit-making activities where subject to 
competitive markets (cannot be used to circumvent the GP provisions.  
Tendering 
Procedures 
To be non-discriminatory & transparent. Open, selective or limited tendering allowed. For selective 
tendering, to invite as many domestic & other party suppliers consistent with efficient procurement 
& considering market conditions. Suppliers to participate to be selected in a fair and non-
discriminatory manner. For selective tendering, may use a list of qualified suppliers or a multi-use 
list established under these provisions. Limited tendering allowed (provided not used to avoid 
maximum competition, protect domestic suppliers, or discriminate against other Party suppliers) if 
no responses received to a prior notice, invitation to participate or tender or conformed to the 
essential requirements, or no supplier met the conditions, or all tenderers colluded; G&S only 
available from a certain supplier & no reasonable alternative or substitute exists due to (a) covers 
works of art (b) protect patents, copyrights, or other exclusive rights, or proprietary information (c) 
competition is absent for technical reasons; for additional deliveries of G&S by the original supplier 
to replace parts, extend, or continue services for existing equipment, software, services, or 
installations, where changing suppliers would compel buying G&S not 
interchangeable/interoperable with existing equipment or would cause significant inconvenience 
or substantial duplication of costs for the procuring entity; commodities; a prototype or a G&S for 
limited trial or developed at its request in the course of, and for, a particular research, experiment, 
study, or original development
45
; as strictly necessary to meet emergencies from unforeseen 
events; new construction services of repeated similar services initially awarded by open tender, or 
by selective tender complying with these provisions if the initial procurement notice stated limited 
tendering may be used; purchases in exceptionally advantageous short-term cases eg unusual 
disposal, unsolicited innovative proposals, liquidation, bankruptcy, or receivership; or for contracts 
awarded winners of a design contest consistent with these provisions & judged independently. 
Awarding contracts Supplier most capable of fulfilling the contractual terms & based solely on the criteria & 
requirements specified in the notices & tender documents, submitted the most advantageous, best 
value or overall greatest value tender; or where price is the sole criterion, the lowest price. 
Multiple thresholds 
depending on 
particular entity: 
 
Australia (a) central entities – G&S = 130,000 SDR; construction = 5,000,000 SDR(b) regional government 
entities – G&S = 355,000 SDR; construction = 5,000,000 SDR (c) government enterprises – G&S = 
450,000 SDR; construction = 5,000,000 SDR.
46
 
Japan (a) central entities – Goods = 100,000 SDR; Services, construction = 4,500,000 SDR, architectural, 
engineering & other technical services = 450,000 SDR, other = 200,000 SDR (b) regional government 
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entities – Goods = 200,000 SDR; Services, construction = 15,000,000 SDR, architectural, engineering 
& other technical services = 1,500,000 SDR, other = 200,000 SDR (c) other entities – Goods = 
130,000 SDR; Services, construction = 4,500,000 SDR or 15,000,000
47
, architectural, engineering & 
other technical services = 450,000 SDR, other = 130,000 SDR.
48
 
Table A5: Summary of Key Government Provisions of KAFTA 
Feature Description 
Coverage  G&S, including construction
49
 (unless noted otherwise) by any contractual means (including 
purchase, rental, or lease), build-operate-transfer contracts, & public works concessions contracts 
equal to or exceeding the relevant threshold values by a covered entity not excluded from 
coverage. Parties affirm the Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Industry Cooperation 
between respective defence ministries of 2001, including amendments or extensions. They 
recognise that the benefits & responsibilities established under the MOU will continue. 
General Principles G&S, & suppliers receive NT, including for locally established foreign-owned or affiliated suppliers 
irrespective of degree of foreign affiliation or ownership. Cannot discriminate against locally 
established suppliers on the basis the goods/services supplied are from the other Party. 
Prohibited Cannot seek, take account of, impose or enforce any offset ie any condition or undertaking that 
encourages local development or improves a Party’s balance-of-payments accounts eg use of 
domestic content, technology licensing, investment, counter-trade. 
General Exclusions Non-contractual agreements or any form of assistance eg grants, loans, equity infusions, fiscal 
incentives, subsidies; goods/services from own entities & by or between procuring entities; directly 
for foreign aid; research & development; overseas (including construction) to consume abroad; 
public employment contracts; acquisition or rental of land, existing buildings, or other immovable 
property or rights thereon; under an international agreement for stationing troops or relating to 
the joint implementation of a project; fiscal agency or depository services, liquidation & 
management services for regulated financial institutions, or services related to the sale, 
redemption & distribution of public debt, including loans & government bonds, notes, derivatives & 
other securities; under the particular procedure or condition of an international organisation, or 
funded by international grants, loans, or other assistance where the applicable procedure or 
condition would be inconsistent with these provisions. 
General Exceptions  Action considered necessary to protect essential security interests indispensable for national 
security or defence purposes. Necessary measures to protect public morals, order or safety, or 
human, animal or plant life or health
50
; intellectual property; relating to G&S of handicapped 
persons, of philanthropic or not for profit institutions, or of prison labour (must not arbitrarily or 
unjustifiably discriminate between Parties under the same prevailing conditions, or act as a 
disguised trade restriction. The Australian industry capability program & successor programs & 
policies. 
Country Exceptions   
Australia  
National NT & non-discrimination not extended to the Australian industry capability program and its 
successor programs and policies. Blood &related products, including plasma derived products & 
plasma fractionation services; government advertising services; health & welfare services; legal 
services; telecommunications; education services; financial services; & transport services. Excludes 
any form of preference benefiting SMEs; measures protecting national treasures of artistic, historic, 
or archaeological value; measures for the health/welfare of Indigenous people, & their economic & 
social advancement. Suppliers of construction services must comply with the National Code of 
Practice for the Construction Industry & related implementation guidelines at all government 
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 15,000,000 SDR for all Group A entities except 4,500,000 SDR for Japan Post Holdings Company Limited, Japan Post 
Company Limited, Japan Post Bank Company Limited, Japan Post Insurance Company Limited, and Management 
Organization for Postal Savings and Postal Life Insurance. All Group B entities 4,500,000 SDR. 
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 Australia may require tenderers for construction to comply with National Code of Practice for the Construction Industry 
and related implementation guidelines at central & regional government.  
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 Covers essential environmental measures to protect human, animal or plant life or health. 
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levels. 
Central entity  Motor vehicles, many specified defence-related & other goods by Department of Defence & 
Defence Material Organization; covering the design, development, integration, test, evaluation, 
maintenance, repair, modification, rebuilding & installation of military systems & equipment; 
operation of Government-owned defence facilities; space services; services supporting military 
forces overseas; G&S procured by, or on behalf of, the Defence Intelligence Organisation, the 
Defence Signals Directorate, the Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation. 
Other entities  Motor vehicles & services (other than construction) excluded. 
States Health & welfare services, education, utility or motor vehicles (ACT); health, welfare, education 
services & motor vehicles (NSW); by a covered entity on behalf of a non-covered entity (NSW, QLD, 
VIC); set-asides on behalf of the Charles Darwin University pursuant to Partnership Agreement with 
state government (NT); by departments, or parts of departments, which deliver health, education, 
training and/or arts (QLD); health services, education services, training services, arts services, 
welfare services, government advertising & motor vehicles (QLD); health & welfare services, 
education services, advertising services, or motor vehicles (SA); health & welfare services, 
education services, or advertising services (TAS); & motor vehicles (VIC). 
Korea  
National Excludes any set-asides for SMEs in accordance with the Act Relating to Contracts to Which the 
State is a Party and its Presidential Decree, and the procurement of agricultural, fishery and 
livestock products in accordance with the Grain Management Act, the Act on Distribution and Price 
Stabilization of Agricultural and Fishery Products, and the Livestock Industry Act. Set-asides for 
SMEs under the Act on Private Participation in Infrastructure are also excluded. Exempted is 
procurement to maintain public order, of blood-related products (including plasma-derived), in 
furtherance of human feeding programs. & for airports. A positive list of specified services covered, 
thereby excluding many services. 
Central entities  A positive list of goods covered by the Ministry of National Defence & Defence Acquisition Program 
Administration, thus excluding most defence-related products for essential security reasons. Only 
services, including construction, listed in Section E & F, & procurement by the Public Procurement 
Service covered. Excludes procurement by the National Police Agency & Korea Coast Guard to 
maintain public order. Excludes set-asides for SMEs under the Act on the Management of Public 
Institutions & the Rule on Contract Business of Public Institutions & Quasi-Governmental 
Institutions, the Local Public Enterprises Act and the Enforcement Regulations of the Local Public 
Enterprise Act. 
‘Other’ entities Services (other than construction) excluded. 
Sub-regional 
entities 
None 
Tendering 
Procedures 
Open, selective or limited tendering allowed. For selective tendering, to invite as many domestic & 
other party suppliers consistent with efficient procurement & considering market conditions. 
Suppliers to participate to be selected in a fair and non-discriminatory manner. Limited tendering 
allowed (provided not used to avoid maximum competition, protect domestic suppliers, or 
discriminate against other Party suppliers) if no responses received to a prior notice, invitation to 
participate or tender or conformed to the essential requirements, or no supplier met the 
conditions, or all tenderers colluded; G&S only available from a certain supplier & no reasonable 
alternative or substitute exists due to (a) covers works of art (b) protect patents, copyrights, or 
other exclusive rights, or proprietary information (c) competition is absent for technical reasons; 
for additional deliveries of G&S by the original supplier to replace parts, extend, or continue 
services for existing equipment, software, services, or installations, where changing suppliers would 
compel buying G&S not interchangeable with existing equipment or would cause significant 
inconvenience or substantial duplication of costs for the procuring entity; commodities; a 
prototype or a G&S for limited trial or developed at its request in the course of, and for, a particular 
research, experiment, study, or original development
51
; as strictly necessary to meet emergencies 
from unforeseen events; new construction services of repeated similar services initially awarded by 
open tender, or by selective tender complying with these provisions if the initial procurement 
notice stated limited tendering may be used; purchases in exceptionally advantageous short-term 
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Malcolm Bosworth 
52 
cases eg unusual disposal, unsolicited innovative proposals, liquidation, bankruptcy, or 
receivership; or for contracts awarded winners of a design contest consistent with these provisions 
& judged independently. 
Awarding contracts Supplier determined to satisfy participatory conditions & whose tender evaluated the most 
advantageous or best value for money, in accordance with specified requirements & criteria. 
Multiple thresholds 
depending on 
particular entity: 
 
Australia (a) central entities – G&S = 130,000 SDR; construction = 5,000,000 SDR (b) sub-central government 
entities – G&S = 355,000 SDR; construction = 5,000,000 SDR (c) other entities – Goods = 450,000 
SDR; construction = 15,000,000 SDR.
52
 
 Korea (a) central entities – G&S = 130,000 SDR; Services, construction = 5,000,000 SDR (b) sub-central 
government entities – G&S = 200,000 SDR; Services, construction = 15,000,000 SDR (c) other 
entities – Goods = 450,000 SDR; Services, construction = 15,000,000
 SDR. 
Table A6: Summary of Key Government Procurement Provisions of NSCEP 
Feature Description 
Coverage Goods & services, including construction. Procurement covers eg purchase, hire, lease, rental, exchange & 
competitive tendering & contracting (outsourcing) by government-controlled bodies eg departments & 
statutory authorities. Best endeavours, consistent with good commercial practice to apply provisions to 
regional or local governments or authorities, & to services by non-governmental bodies exercising powers 
delegated by central, regional or local governments or authorities.  
General 
Principles 
Establish single procurement market to maximise competitive opportunities & reduce costs of doing 
business by adopting APEC Non-Binding Principles of transparency, value for money, open & effective 
competition, fair dealing, accountability & due process, & non-discrimination; ensuring suppliers can 
compete equally & transparently with no preferential schemes or discrimination based on origin.  
General 
Exclusions 
May be agreed for covered government bodies.  
General 
Exceptions 
Procurement of joint bodies with any other State or separate customs territory not in the Agreement; bodies 
funded primarily from special levies on particular industries, by community groups or from special grants or 
public donations. No government body is intended to be granted full exemption. When considering 
applications for partial exemptions, governments are to exercise authority with due diligence. Excludes 
internal procurement from its own bodies where no other supplier asked to tender, unless tenders are 
invited, irrespective if the body submits a tender; proprietary items required to ensure machinery or 
equipment integrity, but only as they relate to biased specifications, unless such items available from a 
number of sources &/or tenders are invited. All provisions apply except as they relate to biased 
specifications; urgent procurement of goods & services in emergencies eg natural disasters, or to meet 
urgent requirements of UN peacekeeping or humanitarian operations; of proprietary equipment of a work, 
health or safety nature specified in industrial agreements (only as they relate to biased specifications), unless 
such items available from a number of sources &/or tenders are invited (all provisions apply except as they 
relate to biased specifications); defence procurement of a strategic nature & for national security; under 
development assistance programmes.  
Prohibited Offsets 
Rules-of-
origin 
Those applied in the normal course of trade between the Parties. 
Awarding 
contracts 
Value for money primary determinant, based on competition & non-discriminating. This is best available 
outcome for money; test involves comparing the whole-of-life costs & benefits eg fitness for purpose, 
quality, performance, price, delivery, accessories & consumables, service support & disposal.  
Threshold Above 50,000 SDR. 
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Table A7: Summary of Key Government Procurement Provisions of NTCEP 
Feature Description 
General 
Principles 
Reaffirm desire to promote & implement to the extent possible the APEC Non-Binding Principles on 
transparency, value for money, open & effective competition, fair dealing, accountability & due process, & 
non-discrimination; & the APEC Transparency Standards. Working Group established to regularly discuss 
relevant issues & to review provisions. It was to report to the CEP Joint Commission within 12 months of the 
Agreement’s entry into force recommending the commencement of bilateral negotiations. Procurement 
disputes do not apply to these provisions unless mandated in by future negotiations.  
Table A8: Summary of Key Government Procurement Provisions of P4 
Feature Description 
Coverage Procurement of goods & services by a positive list of agencies exceeding minimum thresholds. 
Objective Conduct procurement using key principles of transparency, value for money, open and effective 
competition, fair dealing, accountability and due process, and non-discrimination. 
General 
principles 
Goods, services, & suppliers receive national treatment, including for local foreign-owned or affiliated 
firms. Cannot discriminate against local firms based on the goods/services from the other Party. 
Prohibited Offsets 
Rules-of-
origin 
Those applied in the normal course of trade between the Parties. 
General 
exclusions 
Inter-agency procurement, unless tenders are called; non-contractual agreements; any form of assistance 
to persons or governmental authorities eg foreign assistance, grants, loans, equity infusions, fiscal 
incentives, subsidies, guarantees, cooperative agreements, sponsorship arrangements; funded by 
international grants, loans or other assistance with inconsistent conditions to the Agreement; of goods & 
services for consumption abroad; acquisition of fiscal agency or depository services, liquidation & 
management services for regulated financial institutions, & sale & distribution services for government 
debt; & hiring of government employees or other long-term staff & related employment measures. 
General 
exemptions 
Procurement necessary to protect essential security for purchasing arms, ammunition or war materials, or 
indispensable for national security or defence. Necessary measures to protect public morals, order or 
safety, or human, animal or plant life or health; intellectual property; relating to goods & services of 
handicapped persons, of philanthropic or non-profit institutions, or of prison labour (must not arbitrarily or 
unjustifiably discriminate between Parties or act as a disguised trade restriction).  
Tendering 
methods 
Open or selective tendering. Limited tendering allowed (cannot be used to avoid competition, protect 
domestic suppliers) if no responses received to a prior notice, invitation to participate or tender or 
conformed to the essential requirements, or no supplier met the conditions; goods & services only 
available from a certain supplier & no reasonable alternative or substitute exists due to covering works of 
art or protecting patents, copyrights; no competition for technical reasons; further deliveries by the 
original supplier to replace parts, extend, or continue services for existing equipment, software services, or 
installations, where changing suppliers would compel buying goods & services not interchangeable with 
existing equipment; commodities; a prototype or item for limited trial or developed at its request in the 
course of, and for, a particular research, experiment, study, or original development; as strictly necessary 
to meet unforeseen emergencies; extra construction services under the original tender’s objectives that for 
unforeseeable circumstances are necessary to finish the construction services (total value not to exceed 
50% of the main contract); purchases in exceptionally advantageous short-term cases eg unusual disposal 
unsolicited innovative proposals, liquidation; commodities; contracts awarded to winners of a design 
contest consistent with these provisions & judged independently; new construction services of repeated 
similar services initially awarded by open, or by selective tender complying with these provisions if the 
initial procurement notice stated limited tendering may be used. 
Awarding 
tenders 
Unless determined not to be in the public interest, to the supplier determined fully capable of undertaking 
the contract and offering best value for money or be the most advantageous in terms of the essential 
requirements and evaluation criteria set forth in the tender documentation. 
Specific 
exemptions 
 
New 
Zealand 
 
National Procurement by a covered entity for a non-covered entity; of research & development; construction, 
refurbishment or furnishing of chanceries abroad; & of public health, education & welfare services. 
Chile  
National Procurement by a covered entity for a non-covered entity; all financial services of covered entities. 
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Singapore  
 National  Procurement by a covered entity for a non-covered entity; of services (including construction) not in a 
positive list; construction contracts for chanceries abroad and headquarters buildings by the foreign affairs 
ministry; internal Security & Criminal Investigation Departments, the Security Branch & Central Narcotics 
Bureau of the home affairs ministry & that has security considerations.  
Multiple 
thresholds 
Goods & services = 50,000 SDR; construction = 5,000,000 SDR.  
Table A9: Summary of Key Government Procurement Provisions of NZHK 
Feature Description 
Coverage Goods & services, including construction unless indicated otherwise, by contractual means eg purchase, 
hire purchase, rental, lease, build-operate-transfer contracts & public work concessions by covered entities 
exceeding relevant value thresholds. Positive list of central government entities covered & excludes 
defence-related entities (no sub-regional entities).  
General 
Principles 
Procurement to accord with the fundamental principles of the APEC Non-Binding Principles on Government 
Procurement of transparency, value for money, open and effective competition, fair dealing, accountability 
and due process, & non-discrimination, to facilitate competitive opportunities. Goods, services & suppliers 
receive NT, including for local foreign-owned or affiliated suppliers. Cannot discriminate against locally 
established suppliers based on goods/services supplied from the other Party.  
General 
Exclusions 
Procurement from own entities unless tenders are invited; foreign aid; overseas to consume abroad; non-
contractual agreements; any form of assistance to persons or governmental authorities eg cooperative 
agreements, sponsorship arrangements, grants, loans, subsidies, equity infusions, guarantees, fiscal 
incentives & governmental provision; international agreement on stationing troops or to jointly implement 
a project; under an international organisation, or funded by international grants, loans, or other assistance; 
acquisition of fiscal agency or depository services, liquidation & management services for regulated 
financial institutions, or services related to the sale, redemption & distribution of public debt eg loans 
government bonds, notes & other securities; hiring of government employees & related employment 
measures; by a covered entity for a non-entity.  
General 
Exceptions 
Action or not disclosing information considered necessary to protect essential security interests for buying 
arms, ammunition or war materials, or to indispensable for national security or defence. Necessary to 
protect public morals, order or safety, or human, animal or plant life or health; intellectual property; 
relating to goods & services of disabled persons, of philanthropic institutions, or of prison labour. 
Specific 
exemptions 
 
New 
Zealand 
 
National Procurement (including construction) to construct, refurbish, furnish chanceries abroad; for not-profit 
institutions (cannot arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Parties or a disguised trade restriction) 
Central 
entity  
Research & development; public health, education & welfare services.  
Hong Kong  
National All consultancy & franchise arrangements eg build-operate-transfer contracts & public works concession 
contracts; air mail; statutory insurances eg 3
rd
 party liability for vehicles & vessels, & employer’s employee 
liability insurance; & buying office or residential accommodation by the Government Property Agency.  
Central 
entities  
A positive list of covered services eg certain telecoms & financial services.
53
  
Tendering 
Procedures 
Open or selective tendering. Limited tendering (cannot be used to avoid competition or protect domestic 
suppliers) if no responses received to a prior notice, invitation to participate or tender or conformed to the 
essential requirements, or no supplier met the conditions; items only available from a certain supplier & no 
reasonable alternative or substitute exists due to covering works of art or protecting patents, copyrights; 
competition is absent for technical reasons; further deliveries by the original supplier to replace parts, 
extend, or continue services for existing equipment, software services, or installations, where changing 
suppliers would compel buying goods & services not interchangeable with existing equipment; 
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commodities; a prototype or an item for limited trial or developed at its request in the course of, & for, a 
particular research, experiment, study, or original development; as strictly necessary to meet unforeseen 
emergencies; extra construction services under the original tender’s objectives that due to unforeseeable 
circumstances are necessary to complete the construction services (total value cannot exceed 50% of the 
main contract); purchases in exceptionally advantageous short-term cases eg unusual disposal, unsolicited 
innovative proposals, liquidation; commodities; contracts awarded to design contest winners consistent 
with these provisions & judged independently; & new construction services of repeated similar services 
initially awarded by open, or by selective tender complying with these provisions if the initial procurement 
notice stated limited tendering may be used. 
Awarding 
contracts 
Supplier determined fully capable of undertaking the contract & whose tender offers the best value for 
money; or the lowest price; or is the most advantageous in terms of the essential requirements & 
evaluation criteria contained in the tender documentation.  
Multiple 
thresholds 
 
New 
Zealand 
Goods & services = 130,000 SDR; Construction = 5,000,000 SDR 
Hong Kong Goods & services = 130,000 SDR; Construction = 5,000,000 SDR 
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